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Although Asian Americans have the highest growth rate, their electoral 
participation does not commensurate with their numerical strength. This research 
explores the causes of Asian Americans’ low level of electoral participation. I argue that 
acculturation presents barriers for Asian Americans to exert their political power. This 
project combined a survey-based experiment on and in-depth interviews with Asian 
Americans in Austin, in addition to existing data (CPS and the PNAAPS).  
I first estimate the effects of socioeconomic status on turnout across racial and 
ethnic groups. The results demonstrate that while education and income have limited 
effects on Asian American turnout at the aggregate level, their positive influence on 
turnout still holds for Asian Americans at the individual level, though the effect varies by 
nativity. Furthermore, education and income effects on turnout are greatest among 
Whites. The differences of these effects between Whites and Asians are especially 
prominent among the higher socioeconomic stratum. I next find that acculturation 
experiences, group connectedness, and hybrid identity elevate levels of turnout among 
Asian Americans. Those who are more residentially stable and sense shared Asian culture 
are more likely to vote, while the Asian-born are less likely to vote. In addition, 
experiences of racial/ethnic discrimination are likely to turn Asians away from their 
American-ness, while shared cultural commonality helps to foster the “Asian American” 
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identity. Last, the experiment results suggest that a lack of ethnic cues for Asian 
Americans may have contributed to their low turnout rates: Asian American voters value 
descriptive representation, and ethnic cues effectively operate among them, especially the 
less politically engaged. While voters’ support for a coethnic candidate is evident in the 
study, the evidence of their cross- or pan-ethnic support is limited. 
The project provides a window into the political incorporation of immigrant 
populations. The study speaks to the literature on political participation, racial/ethnic 
politics and identity politics. In addition, the findings broaden our understanding of 
minority political behavior, and the process by which immigrant populations incorporate 
into American political system, a promise of democratic representation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Effects Of Acculturation, Group Identity, And Ethnic 
Cues On Asian American Political Participation 
 
Asian American political participation is one of the more puzzling phenomena in 
American mass behavior. Despite their relatively high levels of educational attainment 
and income, Asian Americans have the lowest turnout rates among all racial and ethnic 
groups. This project addresses factors that explain this unusual behavioral pattern. 
Furthermore, if Asian American political participation as a whole does not conform to the 
conventional wisdom positing a strange relationship between socioeconomic status and 
political mobilization, what strategies can energize Asian American voters? 
The underlying motivations of the study are both theoretical and practical. As a 
theoretical matter, scholars of democratic politics are interested in the means by which 
members of the society, new or old, are successfully incorporated into the political 
system. The stability and prosperity of American democracy demands not only liberty, 
but also the representation of the entire panoply of group interests. Yet, new arrivals often 
encounter institutional, social, and psychological barriers that make this difficult. It is, 
therefore, important for scholars to understand the nature of these challenges to particular 
groups. 
Practically, changes in the political party system of the United States tend to be 
driven by the mobilization of new group. Once formed, individual-level party 
attachments tend to last over time, unless dramatic events occur. Thus, in campaigns and 
elections, political elites not only mobilize the preexisting supporters, but also vie for the 
support among new participants in order to broaden the party’s political territory. In 
contemporary American politics, metaphors of the “sleeping giant” and “awakening 
giant” convey the significant potential of Hispanic and Asian American electorates to 
shape the next party system. 
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In the following, I first define “Asian Americans” and outline the demographics 
of the Asian American population with a brief overview on their historical trajectories 
entering the United States. Next, I elaborate the causes that can help researchers 
understand Asian American political participation. Specifically, I emphasize the 
influence of acculturation experiences and group identity on political participation. I 
conclude this chapter by summarizing the project’s larger research questions and 
theoretical framework. 
 
THE ASIAN AMERICAN POPULATION 
Who are “Asian Americans?” Similar to other panethnic identities, such as 
African Americans and Hispanics, Asian American encompasses a range of diverse 
groups. A panethnic identity is a socially constructed label applied (or ascribed) to 
different groups with various cultural traditions and languages (Espiritu 1992). Asian 
Americans include those with ancestries from East Asia (such as Chinese, Japanese, and 
Korean), Southeast Asia (such as Pilipino, Vietnamese, Thai, Cambodian, Lao, and 
Indonesian), and South Asia (such as Asian Indian, Pakistan, and Afghanistan). 
According to the 2008 American Community Survey, Asian Americans of Chinese 
decent were the largest Asian group (3.6 million), followed by Filipinos (3.1 million), 
Asian Indians (2.73 million), Vietnamese (1.73 million), Koreans (1.61 million) and 
Japanese (1.30 million).1  
By the 2010 Census, the estimated number of U.S. residents of Asian descent is 
17.3 million comprising 5.6 percent of the total U.S. population, with sizeable 
                                                
1 These counts included people who were either of a particular Asian group only or were of that group in 
combination with one or more other Asian groups or races. The report is available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb10-ff07.html. 
(Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012) 
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concentrations in California, New York, and Texas.2 The majority (67%) of those who 
identified as Asian American in the census survey were foreign born.3 Foreign born 
Asian Americans outnumber the U.S.-born Asian Americans because the entrance of 
Asians was severely constrained by legislation prior to the 1965 Immigration and 
Naturalization Act (which granted equal chance of new comers from different corners of 
the world) (Takeda 2001). For example, the 1917 Immigration Act (a.k.a. the Asiatic 
Barred Zone Act) heavily regulated immigration of ‘undesirables’ from other countries 
with a focus on the area of Asia; similarly, the 1921 Emergency Quota Law strictly 
limited numbers of immigrants based on the country of birth. 
Congressional regulations on immigration and varying public moods shaped 
various historical trajectories for each ethnic group (Takaki 1989). Prior to the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act, Chinese labors migrated to the U.S., especially to the West Coast, 
seeking job opportunities and escaping from problems in their homelands (Takaki 1989; 
Lien et al. 2004). Because the government deemed the coming of Chinese labors 
“endangers the good order of certain localities within the territory,”4 this Act literally 
closed off Chinese worker migration until the middle of the twentieth century.  
Japanese laborers first mainly migrated to Hawaii, then a territory of the United 
State since 1900. Decades before that, Japanese workers had moved to both Hawaii and 
the mainland driven by the demand for labor in agriculture (Takaki 1989, Lien, Conway, 
and Wong 2004). In California, the intensified local hostility toward the growing number 
                                                
2 The count includes “Asian alone” and “Asian in combination.” The Census Bureau releases the profile on 
Asian/Pacific Americans with an update from the 2010 Census survey and the 2007 survey of Business 
Owners on the Asian and Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander populations. The release is available 
at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/cb11-ff06.html 
(Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012) 
3 The foreign-born population refers to those who were not U.S. citizen or U.S. national at birth. According 
to the 2007 American Community Survey, 68% of non-Hispanic Asian was foreign born (Grieco 2010). 
The report on “Race and Hispanic Origin of the Foreign-born Population in the United States: 2007” is 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-11.pdf (Last Date of Access: March 5, 2012) 
4 The full text of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 is available at 
http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/resources/archives/seven/chinxact.htm. (Last date of access: March 21, 
2012) 
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of Japanese workers led to the 1907 Gentlemen’s Agreement in which the Japanese 
Government agreed to deny passports to laborers intending to enter the U.S. and the U.S. 
agreed to let the brides and families of Japanese laborers enter and re-establish families. 
As a result, the Japanese American population today is largely U.S.-born. 
To replace the vacancy of Chinese and Japanese workers, Korean and Asian 
Indian laborers were recruited (Takaki 1989). The path of Korean laborers was somewhat 
similar to Japanese: their main destinations were Hawaii and California. Their number 
was small until the 1965 Act.5 Similarly, Asian Indian labors were recruited and migrated 
to the United States in the early twentieth century, until the 1917 Asiatic Barred Zone Act 
that banned natives of East, South and Southeast Asia.6  
Vietnamese and Filipino Americans are distinct from most other Asian 
immigrants. Unlike other Asian immigrants entering the United States for job 
opportunities, a massive exodus of Vietnamese political refugees entered the U.S. to 
avoid North Vietnamese troops during the Vietnam War in the 1970s (Takaki 1989). The 
1975 immigration wave was composed of thousands of Vietnamese. Driven by the need 
for emotional and economic support, their concentration is especially evident in Orange 
County, California (Lai 2011).  
The Filipinos, though they did not possess citizenship, were classified as 
“American nationals” because the U.S. acquired the Philippines at end of the Spanish-
American War. During the early twentieth century, Filipino labor with families migrated 
to Hawaiian sugar plantation (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). Though their American 
nationals status prevented them from being affected by the Asiatic Barred Zone Act of 
1917, Filipinos were classified as aliens under the Tydings-McDuffie Act (a.k.a. the 
Philippines Independence Act) which established the commonwealth status of the 
                                                
5 Incidents such as the 1990 Red Apple boycott in New York and the 1992 Los Angeles riot illustrates 
tensions between Korean grocers and other minority groups (Kim 2000). 
6 Unlike other Asians, Asian Indians were Caucasians with darker color skin (Takaki 1989). In addition, as 
part of Britain colony, Indian immigrants enter the United States with some degree of English proficiency. 
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Philippines (Takaki 1989, 331-332). As a result, Filipinos were no longer qualified for 
assistance from New Deal programs such as the National Youth Administration. 
In spite of the different histories and cultural practices within the Asian American 
community, two factors bind individuals together: “Asian American” is both an ascribed 
label and a prescribed identity (Takeda 2001). First, non-Asian Americans, being 
relatively unable or uninterested in recognizing subtle differences in the appearances of 
different Asian ethnicities, have a tendency to group Chinese Americans together with 
Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese Americans and other groups with Asian ancestory. 
The U.S. Census Bureau further reinforces this tendency by bracketing individuals of 
Asian descent as “Asian or Pacific Islander” Americans. Like it or not, Asian Americans 
are viewed as one large group despite great variation in languages and cultural practices.7 
Second, the shared cultural similarities and experiences in the U.S. help members 
of different Asian ethnicities form a bond. For instance, cultural practices such as food 
choices and eating habits (e.g., rice and chopsticks), festival celebration (e.g., the lunar 
New Year), and familial structures (e.g., the hierarchical positions of family members) 
among Asian Americans forge a sense of shared cultural and societal values within the 
community. Conceptually, the “Asian American” panethnic identity connects individuals 
to a larger community in which members view themselves as occupying the same social 
position. 
There is another source of pan-ethnic similarity: Asian Americans as a whole tend 
to have more socioeconomic resources than other racial and ethnic minority groups. 
Educational attainment for Asian Americans and non-Hispanic Whites is higher than 
African Americans and Hispanics (Ryan and Siebens 2012). Indeed, Census figures 
                                                
7 Two automobile workers beat Vincent Chin, a 27-year-old Chinese American, in June 1982 for blaming 
the loss of their jobs on foreign cars. The workers thought Chin was Japanese American. 
(http://www.freep.com/article/20110812/NEWS01/108120472/Vincent-Chin-s-beating-death-recalled-
AAJA-convention) (last date of access: April 27, 2012) 
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indicate that Asian Americans ($75,027) have higher mean family income levels than 
non-Hispanic Whites ($62,545), African Americans ($38,409), or Hispanics ($39,730).8 
This economic success requires additional comment as it is to the puzzle of low 
Asian American turnout. Three causes may have contributed to the socioeconomic 
success of Asian Americans. First, the 1965 Immigration Act allows three groups to enter 
the United States: political refugees, individuals with professional skills, and family 
members of those who are already in the country. As a result, an influx of professionals 
and highly skilled Asian workers set foot in the United States from 1960s through the 
twenty-first century.  
Furthermore, economic security and the need for high education attainment are 
among the very highest priorities of Asian Americans. Job opportunities and the lure of 
prosperity attracted Asian laborers to the United States. Desires to achieve economic 
success outweigh concerns about hostile or discriminatory practices either at the 
workplace or in American society.  
Last, in addition to the Asian cultural emphasis on education, education is 
considered the only way to increase one’s social mobility, because Asian Americans 
encounter strict limitations on succeeding in other areas (Sue and Okazaki 1990). But this 
economic success has not translated into increased democratic participation nor have we 
seen Asian American interests particularly well represented in government. This is contra 
the experience of other nationalities (e.g., the Irish, Italians, or Polish) and runs contrary 
to our attendant theoretical expectations (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). 
 
                                                
8 The figures are available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0697.pdf. (Last Date 
of Access: March 5, 2012) 
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ACCULTURATION EXPERIENCES, GROUP IDENTITY, AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
As suggested above, the prediction of higher participation and turnout among 
Asian Americans is not borne out in reality. Contrasting with African Americans and 
Hispanics, whose participation seems to increase if they can overcome the socioeconomic 
barriers, Asian Americans, mostly stay at home during elections despite having higher 
levels of aggregate education and income. To understand their paradoxical rates of 
political participation, researchers must understand the experiences of Asian Americans. 
As mentioned earlier, the majority of the Asian American population is foreign-
born. That implies the majority of Asian Americans are still in the acculturation process 
in which cultural and psychological changes take place resulting from contact between 
two or more cultural groups and individual members. Individual behavioral repertoires 
also change accordingly (Berry 2005). In short, acculturation experiences refer to the 
degree to which a person adapts to the present surroundings. Through this process 
individuals experience collision and negotiation between the culture from their 
homelands and the culture of the host society, the result is typically some form of 
adaptation and adjustment. 
To achieve full integration, Asian Americans must surmount several barriers to 
the acculturation processes, such as language, knowledge about the American political 
system, and pervasive concern about economic security. Compared to a traditional non-
Hispanic White household in which children pick up political cues from parental 
discussion about American politics, children in Asian American households do not hear 
much conversation about either American politics or general politics. Even if immigrant 
parents talk about political affairs, the topics are more likely related to politics in their 
homelands.9 In short, much of the Asian American population is probably still adapting 
and adjusting. 
                                                
9 Interest in politics of homelands, however, is found to have positive impact on political participation in 
American politics (Junn et al. 2008). 
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Given their unique paths to the United States and distinct characteristics of the 
Asian American population, the first element of the project examines the influence of 
acculturation experiences and group identity on their political participation. Many of my 
expectations with respect to acculturation are commonsensical. The more adapted they 
are (for example, in the form of improved English proficiency), the more likely Asian 
Americans are to take part in the political system. In particular, I posit that acculturation 
experiences such as adapting to use English and interactions with other Asian Americans 
and non-Asian Americans help to connect individuals to a broader collective body. 
Whether this connection is forged by a sense of shared social position, culture, or 
prejudice, it helps to shape and/or update individuals’ group identities in response to not 
only the present society but also the imagined communities and thus likely greater 
participation, especially when specific threat to the group is present. 
Similarly, I expect group identity to play a major role in shaping Asian American 
political participation. More specifically, I posit that the identity that embraces one’s 
American-ness as well as Asian-ness or her own ethnicity helps to elevate her possibility 
of voting. Similar to African American linked fate (Dawson 1994) and co-ethnic cues for 
Hispanic voters (Barreto 2010), “Asian American” or “ethnic American” (e.g., Chinese 
American) identity should have positive impact on Asian American political 
participation. The claim of American-ness entitles the individual’s political rights, while 
the declaration of Asian-ness or ethnicity motivates the individual to act with the 
imagined community in mind. In short, the panethnic identity prompts individual Asian 
Americans to participate in politics. 
If the above proposition is true, ethnic cues should be able to energize Asian 
American voters. The second major element of the project examines whether descriptive 
representation theory holds for Asian Americans. Descriptive representation theory 
predicts groups prefer to elect representatives who share similar sociological traits. The 
number of successfully elected Asian American officials at the federal level is limited: 
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only eight Asian American members served in the second session of the 110th Congress 
(Tong 2008).10 Asian American candidates have been more successful in local elections 
in some heavily Asian suburban areas but the relevant universe of instructive cases is still 
somewhat limited (Lai 2011).11 We do have enough evidence to begin to speculate on 
some relationships, however, and it is clear that political elites and party operatives face 
challenges in engaging Asian American voters. 
If Asian Americans are motivated to participate politically by the presence of co-
ethnics on the ballot, the parties might be tempted to promote such candidates, given the 
growing size of the Asian American electorate. As it stands now, low turnout levels mean 
that political parties lack motivation to appeal to Asian American voters (Kim 2007; Lee 
and Hajnal 2011). However, given the rapid growth of the Asian American population 
and the history of how political party system changes (Anderson 1979), both the 
Democratic and Republican Party will probably see Asian Americans as a tempted target 
to boost their fortunes if they think descriptive representation will draw them to the polls. 
Indeed, this is probably already occurring despite the absence of systematic evidence that 
descriptive representation is facilitates mobilization. For instance, Governor Nikki Haley 
caught attention at the 2011 RedState Gathering at Charleston, South Carolina, where her 
name was floated as a vice-presidential hopeful (Shahid 2011). 
                                                
10 Nine Asian Pacific Americans served in the first session of the 110th Congress: two Senators, six 
Representatives, and one Delegate. With the resignation of one Representative (Bobby Jindal won the 
gubernatorial election in Louisiana and sworn in as governor) at the beginning of the second session, eight 
Asian Pacific Americans served the 110th Congress. The eight Asian Pacific Americans are Eni F.H. 
Faleomavaega (Democrat, the non-voting delegate representing American Samoa’s at-large district), Mazie 
Keiko Hirono (Democrat representing the 2nd congressional district of Hawaii), Michael M. Honda 
(Democrat representing the 15th congressional district of California), Bobby Jindal (Republican 
representing the 1st congressional district of Louisiana), Doris Okada Matsui (Democrat representing the 
5th congressional district of California), Robert Cortez Scott (Democrat representing the 3rd congressional 
district of Virginia), David Wu (Democrat representing the 1st congressional district of Oregon), Daniel 
Kahikina Akaka (Democrat, Senator for Hawaii), and Daniel Ken Inouye (Democrat, Senator for Hawaii). 
http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/97-398.pdf (Last Date of Access: March 7, 2012) 
11 Lai (2011) examines success and failure of Asian American candidates in city council elections and finds 
that in addition to the size of Asian American populations, ethnic-based organizations and media play 
critical roles in increasing candidates’ visibility, coordinating and publicizing campaign activities. 
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To briefly restate the research plan, my empirical analyses have three 
components. First, I estimate the relationship between Asian American socioeconomic 
resources and their political participation by comparing their education, income, and 
turnout rates to other racial and ethnic groups. These comparisons make it clear how the 
conventional wisdom fails to explain Asian American political participation at the 
aggregate level. Second, I explore the causes of Asian American political participation by 
examining the impacts of acculturation experiences and group identity on turnout. Third 
and finally, I investigate the effect of ethnic cues on Asian American turnout, building 
upon descriptive representation theory.  
In the next chapter, I first survey general theories of political participation and 
theories conceptualizing minority political participation. Building upon the existing 
literature, I outline the theoretical framework of the project and identify several working 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are then tested in subsequent empirical chapters. The main 
argument, pursued throughout, is that the particular nature of the Asian American 
immigration experience emphasizes the role of acculturation and group identities—
independent of socioeconomic status—on political participation. This insight provides a 
relevant blueprint for those seeking to increase Asian American turnout, as well as those 
interested in extending or refining democratic theories such as interest group liberalism. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Perspectives On Political Participation Among Asian 
Americans 
 
Asian-American political participation is possibly the most complicated of all 
ethnic groups in the US. Asian Americans come from different countries; they speak 
different languages; and they arrived in different waves of immigration. And yet there is 
reason to think that these different groups are linked in some important way. Asians in 
America share some common elements, irrespective of their particular country of origin. 
This project treats this panethnic group as a whole, and seeks to understand the nature of 
voter turnout for this burgeoning population. 
The factors affecting Asian-American political participation are more complex 
than those for other racial or ethnic groups in the United States. The conventional 
wisdom states that higher socioeconomic status (SES) will lead to a higher degree of 
political engagement. The better educated, on average, have better skills and are thus 
more likely to find higher-paying jobs. Skills and money, in turn, are critical resources 
for political power. However, the link between SES and political participation does not 
seem to hold for Asian Americans. In 2008, Asians earned the highest real median 
income ($65,637) among all racial groups, followed by non-Hispanic Whites ($55,530), 
Hispanics ($37,913), and Blacks ($34,213) (U.S. Census Bureau 2009a). Similarly, with 
regard to educational achievement, in 2008 more than half of Asians in the United States 
(53 percent) held at least a bachelor’s degree, compared to 33 percent of non-Hispanic 
Whites, 20 percent of Blacks, and 13 percent of Hispanics (U.S. Census Bureau 2009b). 
Yet, in the 2008 presidential election, non-Hispanic Whites and Blacks showed the 
highest turnout rates among adult citizens (66 percent and 65 percent, respectively), 
compared with only half of Hispanics (50 percent) and Asians (48 percent) (U.S. Census 
Bureau n.d.). The question, then, is obvious: why does a relatively affluent and well-
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educated group under-participate politically? A second, follow-up question is: what 
strategies will effectively energize Asian Americans to vote? The growing population of 
Asian Americans implies increasing political potential, but what steps must be taken to 
help Asian Americans achieve their “fair” share of political power? 
Political participation is the cornerstone of democracy, and voting is its most 
basic and regular form. Participatory norms, however, are not necessarily ingrained in 
newcomers' minds. Given rapid demographic changes in the United States, a better 
understanding of how immigrants behave politically and the consequences of their 
behavior is vital. The conventional wisdom assumes that turnout and political 
participation are the results of individuals having the means (or skills) to overcome the 
costs of acting, and that socioeconomic status thus best explains political participation. 
This approach, however, is problematic when it comes to explaining the participation 
patterns of Asian immigrants and their descendants. 
Relatively speaking, we know quite a bit about the political behavior of African 
Americans and Hispanics. The nature and causes of political participation among Asian 
Americans are not as well known. Indeed, the voting behavior of Asian Americans is one 
of the more intriguing puzzles of contemporary American politics. As suggested above, 
one would expect Asian Americans to vote and be active in politics, given their high 
levels of income and educational attainment relative to Latinos, African-Americans and 
Whites. Asian Americans, however, participate less than other racial and ethnic groups 
(Cho 1995; Leighley and Vedlitz 1999; Ong and Scott 2009). This participation gap 
lessens the political significance of the current population growth rates of Asian 
Americans, while at the same time providing a lingering opportunity for parties and 
candidates seeking to boost their fortunes by mobilizing peripheral electorates (Andersen 
1979).  
The notion that political participation dynamics vary by racial groups is widely 
accepted, even as we begin to empirically examine the specific case of Asian Americans. 
 13 
One obvious explanation for low turnout is the immigrant experience; but the nature of 
the experience is complex and evolving. The so-called fourth-wave of migration—
disproportionately from Asia, the Caribbean, and Latin America—has transformed the 
racial and ethnic composition of the United States (Lee 2008). The residential patterns of 
these newcomers seem to have a significant impact on their political behavior as 
information flows through community networks, affecting political socialization 
experiences, and offering more or less encouragement for participation among new 
residents and their offspring in different locales (Cho, Gimpel, and Dyck 2006). In 
particular, residential dispersion decreases the size of immigrant communities and 
reduces the incentives for parties and candidates to woo these groups, diminishing their 
(political) power. This phenomenon has been especially acute among Asian American 
groups, leaving scholars grasping for ways to explain low levels of political engagement 
and participation. 
Our lack of understanding is important given that Asian Americans are a 
burgeoning segment of the electorate, especially in states like California, New York, and 
Texas. Mobilizing immigrant groups is significant for improving democratic functioning 
in the U.S., as it is in many other democratic countries with sizable immigrant 
populations. For example, Germany has a large and diverse immigrant population. 
Moreover, its government has identified increased political participation of immigrants as 
an important policy target (Cyrus 2005). Since World War II, the immigration flow first 
to West Germany, and later into the unified Germany, was composed mainly of workers 
from southern Europe.12 Although public authorities launched programs on federal, state 
and local levels to promote political participation among immigrants, these efforts 
                                                
12 During the same period, several ethnic Germans who previously resided in East Europe and Soviet 
Union flooded into Germany until 1993 its immigration has been limited to 220,000 per year. Ethnic 
Germans could immediately gain German citizenship upon arrival according to Article 116 of the Basic 
Law. They received much financial and social assistance to ease their integration into society: housing, 
vocational training, and many other types of assistance, even language training were liberally provided 
(Solsten 1996). 
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historically targeted ethnic Germans. Only recently have foreign immigrants been 
included in these special programs. A more significant policy declaration occurred when 
Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel hosted the first National Integration Summit on July 
14, 2006, which focused on how to move integration forward.13 The Basic Law and a 
series of governmental actions underscored the importance of incorporating immigrants 
and their children into German society. 
France presents a similar case of how immigration became part of the parties’ 
political agenda (Schuerkens 2005). In France’s case, the main immigration flow came 
from other European and African countries.14 The underlying rationale for migration to 
France has changed from economics (better job opportunities) to politics (political 
asylum) over time.15 This has produced strains, though, as the country has had to adapt to 
deal with an influx of unskilled labor. The 2006 immigration and integration law, for 
example, encouraged the migration of highly skilled workers and students, while the rules 
of family reunification and access to residence and citizenship were constricted and 
limited. Political participation among immigrant groups in France is generally quite low, 
and the larger question of how they will be incorporated into the party system is pressing 
(Schuerkens 2005). 
This study is motivated by both an abiding interest in the engagement of minority 
groups in the political arena as well as a concern about the direction and competitive 
balance of the current party system. In this chapter, I consider existing explanations—
especially the socioeconomic (SES) model—and then discuss what might explain Asian 
American turnout and participation, given what we know of other minority groups. I will 
                                                
13 German Federal Ministry of Interior, 
http://www.bmi.bund.de/EN/Themen/MigrationIntegration/Integration/NatIntegrationsplan/natIntegrations
plan_node.html. (last access date: November 01, 2010) 
14 Unlike Germany, migration was not only limited to the introduction of a labor force, 
but legal acts permitted families to migrate to France (Schuerkens 2005). 
15 Even when the United States introduced entry quotas in the 1920s, France continued to be open for 
laborers and persecuted people (Schuerkens 2005). 
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then discuss the empirical plan of the project. The chapter consists of three sections: first, 
I review the literature and develop a theoretical basis for the project; second, I outline the 
research design for each empirical chapter; third, I summarize the significance of the 
project, focusing on the potential of Asian American political participation in 
contemporary American politics. 
 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION: AN OVERVIEW 
The existing literature presents various perspectives that collectively offer a wide 
range of factors to account for political participation. Scholars generally argue that 
socioeconomic status (SES, i.e., some combination of income, education, and occupation) 
determines access to resources, and thus conditions an individual’s participation in 
politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 
1980; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). The central tenet of the SES model is that 
people with higher socioeconomic status are more likely to participate in politics. SES 
increases the opportunity to accumulate resources such as money and time, which 
translates into increased participation. These factors together are known as “the baseline 
model” of American political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 281). 
Regardless of the metrics used for “class,” studies consistently demonstrate that higher-
status individuals are more actively involved in politics (Milbrath and Goel 1977, 92). 
While agreeing with the importance of SES for political participation, some 
scholars have questioned the means by which these two are linked. In unpacking the 
concept of SES, some argue that education has a greater impact on voting than income or 
occupation (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). Others have been more ambivalent (Verba 
and Nie 1972). This ambivalence may reflect the views of the architects of the SES 
model, which shows that the participant population is skewed in the direction of upper-
status citizens, but does not explain which resources are contributory, nor how those 
resources are linked to political participation.  
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Individual resources can be grouped into three categories: time, money, and civic 
skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Civic skills explain the critical link between 
SES and political participation in the United States. The term “civic skills” refers to one’s 
ability to express one's opinions freely and to work with others to achieve common 
interests. In a manner similar to income-levels, civic skills allow individuals to wield 
political influence over policy outcomes. In cultivating civic skills, education facilitates 
organization and communication skills, as well as a better understanding of the political 
system and political issues. More importantly, civic skills are usually acquired at an early 
age and possibly in non-political institutions (such as church) (Verba, Schlozman and 
Brady 1995; Kirlin 2003). 
Civic skills, nevertheless, are not easy to measure directly and precisely. Civic 
engagement, however, provides a reasonable proxy (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; 
Kirlin 2003). The argument is that participation in civic activities spurs the development 
of civic skills—both political and non-political. For racial and ethnic minorities, joining 
racial or ethnic organizations may thus aid the cultivation of civic skills, regardless of 
what type of identity the organizations embrace. These skills, in turn, become a valuable 
resource promoting political participation. In explaining participation, voting, and 
political discussion, Verba and his colleagues find that church attendance indeed has a 
significant impact on political participation (338, 352), which supports the idea of civic 
engagement as a proxy for civic skills and a driver of political participation. 
With a greater emphasis on resources, the civic voluntarism model also 
incorporates  the notions of “recruitment” and “mobilization” (Verba, Schlozman, and 
Brady 1995). Recruiting solicits political support while mobilizing activates previously 
inactive supporters (Aldrich 1997). Both help decrease the cost of participation and thus 
increase the willingness of individuals to take political action.16 For instance, lower SES 
                                                
16 For the purpose of demonstration, “recruitment” and “mobilization” are treated as interchangeable in the 
project. 
 17 
individuals rely on mobilization efforts by candidates and parties, and are especially 
responsive to ideology and group-based resources (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Hill and Leighly 1996).17 The logic is that party 
organizations and campaign workers, by providing information about candidates and 
voting, decrease the cost and increase the incentives for voters to cast ballots.18 There is 
no doubt that party mobilization plays a key role in voter turnout and behavior, but the 
political socialization of an individual is perhaps even more critical. 
Political socialization is the process by which individuals acquire and develop 
their own particular political orientations. It typically begins at an early age. Repeated 
exposure to political affairs triggers political learning and helps to define the meaning of 
important concepts. The information flowing around the dining table can explicitly or 
implicitly stimulate the desire of children in the family to understand its concepts. Based 
on social learning theory, children are rational actors who seek their parents’ attention 
and learn from their parents’ positive and negative feedback. Children who hear their 
parents talking about politics learn that being alert to the political world is important, and 
these children typically develop an interest in politics.19  
In particular, if parents are highly politicized and over time provide consistent 
political cues, their children tend to adopt their parents’ political orientations, even 
though political events, different family structures (e.g., single parent family or divorced 
household), and outside information may complicate the transmission of political 
orientations from parents to their offspring (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009). With 
                                                
17 Hill and Leighly (1996) analyze 1978-1990 turnout rates by social class, state, and year and find that in 
presidential elections the more liberal and competitive the Democratic Party in a state, the greater the 
mobilization of lower-class voters, and the higher relative turnout of lower classes. 
18 Green and Gerber (2004), however, further point out that information itself is not enough to mobilize 
voters. Their field experiment results suggest that effective Get Out The Vote tactics should make voters 
feel wanted and invoke voters' personal motivations. In short, more personal contacts are better. 
19 Taking a slightly different view, some scholars emphasize the connection between children’s 
communication with their parents and the children’s learned understanding on the importance of political 
involvement (Erikson and Tedin 2006). 
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successful top-down political socialization, children are likely to continue their parents' 
political legacy. 
In the political world, socialization plays a critical role in transforming available 
resources into actual influence on policy outcomes. Higher levels of education and 
income, though facilitating the acquisition of civic skills (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 
1995), do not automatically become participatory assets (Cho 1999). It is through 
socialization that most people learn the means and value of political participation. In 
other words, people learn democratic values and civic norms from those close to them. 
These ideas of engaging in public affairs and processes are usually reinforced in school. 
Education increases the likelihood of learning these behaviors, but other socialization 
agents are equally, if not more, important. In addition, socialization experiences shape 
individuals’ views of one’s self and one’s own groups. 
 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS 
General overviews of political participation usually focus on non-Hispanic White 
voters. Racial and ethnic minorities, however, often have different experiences than 
Whites. Scholars have developed several different theories for explaining political 
participation among racial and ethnic minorities. For example, group identity and group 
consciousness can be effective in motivating members of minority groups to vote. Group 
identity is a sense of membership, an objective inclusion (Huddy, 2003:513), along with a 
psychological attachment to a particular stratum (Miller, et al., 1981:495). When group 
identity is politically activated, the individual becomes conscious of the political gain and 
loss resulting from this identity. Such awareness is particularly heightened when an 
outside threat to the group is present. Therefore, group consciousness requires group 
identity and “a political awareness or ideology regarding the group’s relative position in 
society along with a commitment to collective action aimed at realizing the group’s 
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interests” (Miller, et al., 1981:495).20 Though group identity is a necessary condition for 
group consciousness, it is not sufficient to cause an individual to take action. In short, 
group identity is likely to influence the acquisition of information (Conover 1984:762-3), 
while group consciousness serves as a utility heuristic that helps interpret pieces of 
information (Conover 1985:141-3; Dawson 1994:61).  
Given the significance of group affinity, researchers should be cautious about 
delineating the aspects of group identity that condition group members’ voting behavior 
(Lee 2008). Two aspects of group identity should be highlighted. First, an individual can 
have multiple group identities. These identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive, 
but are assigned different degrees of salience in various contexts by the possessor 
(Cohen, 1999:14). For example, an African American with high socioeconomic status 
faces the cross-pressures of race and class.21 Cross-pressured people are those with two or 
more social factors pushing their political preferences in different directions (Berelson et 
al., 1954:283). Those with contradictory political views tend to turn to their surroundings 
to seek cues (293). Therefore, the immediate context plays an important role in their 
decision-making process. Sometimes, these people are discouraged from political 
participation due to the inconsistency of preferences suggested by different race and class 
identities (Berelson et al., 1954, 284; Mutz, 2002, 838).22 
Second, group identity, instead of being a fixed condition, is a fluid social 
construct that changes in response to one’s immediate context (Huddy, 2001:134). 
Nevertheless, when group identity is strong, a change in context will have less impact on 
                                                
20 Several scholars follow the same definitions: for example, Conover and Feldman, 1984:155, Stokes, 
2003:363-4; Sanchez, 2006:438-9. 
21 From the view of African American linked fate (i.e., what happened to other African Americans in this 
country will have something to do with what happens in this individual’s personal life), he or she is more 
likely to identify with the Democratic Party (Uhlaner et al., 1989; Dawson, 1994; Leighley, 2001). On the 
other hand, based on his or her socioeconomic status, the person is more likely to identify with the 
Republican Party. 
22 On the other hand, a combination of multiple identities may also reinforce the tendency to act if those 
identities point toward the same preference/outcome. 
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the individual (147). When a group identity is highly stable, the intergroup boundary is 
more rigid, and group identity serves as a powerful political heuristic (145). On the other 
hand, this rigid group boundary also constrains the possibility of extending the boundary 
to form a larger coalition that includes other racial and ethnic minority groups (Kaufmann 
2003a, 200). Indirectly, rigid group boundaries limit minority political empowerment to a 
fragmented, group-specific political empowerment. 
As suggested above, group identity is related to (though distinct from) the concept 
of political empowerment, which is “the extent to which a group has achieved significant 
representation and influence in political decision making” (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 378). 
Though Black empowerment has had a significant positive impact on Blacks’ 
sociopolitical participation, this does not hold true for non-Black minority groups. 
Symbolic rewards of minority empowerment are fairly group-specific (Kaufmann 
2003b).23 This implies that enhanced group-specific engagement (specifically, the higher 
turnout rates) is not likely to be shared by other groups. For instance, Black 
empowerment may not be relevant for understanding the political orientation of Mexican 
Americans (or Asian Americans) in Los Angeles (Gilliam 1996, 76).24  
Social and political scientists have systematically examined political 
representation among African Americans, Hispanics, and females in the past decades. 
The passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965 unlocked the door of political power to 
racial minorities. Although there has been an increase in the number of African American 
elected officials, African Americans remain politically underrepresented (Barker, Jones, 
and Tate 1999; Walton and Smith 2003). The paucity of African American elected 
officials can be partially attributed to the reluctance of White voters to elect African 
American candidates (Terkildsen 1993), and partially to factors such as the candidates' 
                                                
23 Kaufmann (2003b) analyzed four mayoral elections (1983-2003) in Denver, Colorado in which the first 
Latino, and subsequently the first Black, mayor were elected. 
24 Gilliam’s analysis (1996) is based on the 1990 Southern California Social Survey data. 
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ideology and electability (Tate 2003). In other words, an African American candidate in 
an African American district does not guarantee an electoral victory.  
Nonetheless, in order to get elected, African American candidates need 
overwhelming support from African American voters (Adler 2001). Vote choice aside, 
the appearance of African American candidates' names on the ballot slightly increases 
turnout among African Americans (Gay 2001). The underlying mechanism is that African 
Americans hold more positive views of African American candidates than Whites (Tate 
1993).25 
Similar results have been observed among Hispanics and women (Welch and 
Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Duerst-Lahti and Verstegen 1995; Sapiro and 
Conover 1997). A growing population of Hispanics in a district increases the turnout 
among Hispanic voters and enhances the chance that a Hispanic representative candidate 
gets elected (Welch and Hibbing 1984). Studies on female representation, however, show 
more variation. While some scholars find that female candidates are more appealing to 
and can energize female voters (Duerst-Lahti and Verstegen 1995; Sapiro and Conover 
1997; Philpot and Walton 2007), some argue that conditions such as issue salience 
(Paolino 1995), individual candidate characteristics (Ekstrand and Eckert 1981), or race 
(Sigelman and Welch 1984) have an interactive impact with gender on vote decisions. 
 
ASIAN AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
Since President Johnson signed the Immigration and Nationality Act (a.k.a., Hart-
Celler Immigration Act) into law in 1965, a massive influx of immigrants from Asian 
countries have entered the United States. The legislation phased out the strict national 
origins quota system first imposed in 1921. Race-based quotas were no longer in effect, 
                                                
25 Using the 1984 National Black Election Study, Tate (1993) finds that African Americans rated Jesse 
Jackson more favorably than Whites. However, other scholars contend that African American support for 
African American candidates conditions on individual voters’ ideologies (Griffin and Keane 2006). 
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but were instead replaced by nationality-based quotas. In addition to newcomers from 
Latin America and the West Indies, immigrants from Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, India, 
Iran, the Philippines, and other countries surpassed the 100,000 people level during the 
second half of the twentieth century (Fiorina, Peterson, Johnson, and Mayer 2010). 
According to the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the top countries of origin 
for naturalization were (in the following order): Mexico, India, Philippines, China and 
Vietnam in 2009.26 In light of this, scholars have gradually turned their attention to Asian 
Americans (Cho 1999; Chang 2001; Nakanishi and Lai 2003; C.J. Kim 2003; Lien, 
Conway, and Wong 2004; Wong 2006; T. Kim 2007; Aoki and Takeda 2008; Lai 2011; 
Wong, Ramakrishnan, Lee, and Junn 2011). 
This attention has uncovered at least one uncontrovertible fact: the 
aforementioned participation models may not be entirely reasonable or appropriate for 
explaining Asian American behavior. Unlike African Americans who share a collective 
memory of slavery, unlike Hispanics who mostly share the common language of Spanish, 
and unlike both African Americans and Hispanics who on average have a lower SES 
level than Whites, Asians in the United States present a peculiar case.27 Perhaps more to 
the point, “immigrants who travel through separate socialization channels may have a 
very different cost and benefit structure from native-born Americans” (Cho 1999, 1144). 
Facing a dramatic change in living environment, it takes time (sometimes several 
generations) to learn the meanings and norms of the host society, and to find and define 
their own place and role—whether it is acquired (Tse 1999; Kiang 2001) or ascribed 
(Kim 2000). 
                                                
26 “Naturalization Fact Sheet” is available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=b62aef
6b56c1b210VgnVCM100000082ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=68439c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000045f3d
6a1RCRD (Last date of access: March 15, 2012). 
27 For instance, Claire Kim (1999) argues that Asian Americans are racially triangulated and situated 
outside the existing Whites-Blacks racial order. 
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Despite the ethnic diversity within the Asian community, there is sufficient reason 
to treat different Asian ethnicities as similar in the present study. Though they do not 
share the same language, Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, and Japanese all embrace 
hierarchical family structures and share some cultural reference points. In addition, all 
Asian subgroups encounter similar acculturation experiences. For example, the language 
barrier is a major obstacle for virtually all Asians to fully integrate into American society 
(except, of course, for Filipinos and Indians). I therefore assume the phrase “Asian 
American” has some associative meaning for the groups lumped under this heading, even 
as I acknowledge the considerable differences between and among Asian nationalities. 
In this study, I argue that the SES model and mobilization theory fail to explain 
Asian American participation at the group level. Given their relatively high levels of 
socioeconomic resources in the aggregate, one would expect Asian Americans to be the 
most participatory in the country; however, this is not borne out in reality.  In contrast, I 
suggest that current low levels of participation among Asian Americans largely reflect 
their political acculturation experiences, which shape their views of themselves: whether 
they see themselves as part of the American society and/or political system, and to what 
extent they identify with any major racial and ethnic community in the U.S.  In other 
words, Asian American political participation is driven by distinct acculturation and 
socialization experiences, which affect the individual’s sense of group identity. This 
assumption implies that intermediate factors exist but have been neglected in earlier 
analyses. 
Similarly, mobilization theory falls short in explaining Asian American 
participation in two ways. First, Asian Americans have not yet effectively garnered 
attention from the two major parties (Kim 2007; Hajnal and Lee 2011). Second, 
successful get-out-the-vote efforts that would translate Asian American SES into political 
force depend on empowered community-based political organizations and active ethnic 
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press (Wong 2004). These organizations and press outlets are sporadically and unevenly 
distributed across the country. 
In addition, several confounding theories stand out. Though some may argue that 
transnational ties to politics of homelands may distract immigrants from integrating into 
the host society, scholars find evidence supporting the opposite. Those who are more 
involved or interested in politics of their homelands, as a matter of fact, are also more 
likely to participate in American politics (Junn et al. 2008). In addition, while political 
information and (external and internal) efficacy are positively related to voting (Lassen 
2005; Finkel 1985; Tolbert and Mcneal 2003), I consider these concepts more as products 
of acculturation, rather than part of the acculturation process. This is not to say that these 
factors have no influence on Asian American political participation, but for the sake of 
simplicity in the present study,28 I thus focus on the impact of acculturation on 
participation. 
 
ACCULTURATION AND SOCIALIZATION EXPERIENCES AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS 
Acculturation is “the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes 
place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual 
members.” In particular, at the individual level, acculturation involves “changes in a 
person's behavioral repertoire” (Berry 2005, 698-699). Put another way, acculturation 
refers to the degree to which one adapts to the present environment. Through 
acculturation, individuals experience collision and negotiation between the pre-existing 
culture from their homelands and the present culture embraced by the host society, an 
ongoing process that leads to adaptation and adjustment. 
                                                
28 For example, political efficacy and political participation may have reciprocal effect on each other 
(Finkel 1985). 
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On the other hand, political socialization relates to experiences that transmit 
political orientation and values from parents to their children (Merelman 1986, 279).29 In 
general, the first and most important socialization agent one encounters is one’s parents. 
For immigrant families, however, the socialization process is not always top-down, from 
parents to children, but sometimes actually reverses the direction (Wong and Tseng 
2008). What happens in high-status Anglo households may not take place in high-status 
Asian households. And to the extent the process is top-down, many immigrant parents 
contribute to the political learning process of their children primarily through discussions 
about politics in their country of origin, rather than about American politics (Wong and 
Tseng 2008).  
Although a comprehensive study of Asian American political participation 
requires some understanding of socialization processes, my focus here is on acculturation 
rather than socialization. Partly, this is practical. Socialization processes are almost 
impossible to observe and relying on recall measures to estimate relationships is fraught 
with peril. Partly, however, it is theoretical. The majority of Asian Americans are 
naturalized and acculturation seems a more relevant and interesting target if we are to 
advance our broader knowledge of Asian American turnout. 
What do we know about acculturation and politics among Asian Americans? A 
few basic facts stand out. Among the Hispanic and Asian communities in the United 
States, the major hurdles for stepping into the political world are often the language 
barrier (Cho 1999) and nativity (Cho 1999; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Ong and 
Scott 2009). With limited English proficiency, some may not fully understand the 
political system or know where to turn for help. In order to participate in politics, 
immigrant parents sometimes rely on their offspring—whose native tongue is English—
for help (Wong and Tseng 2008).  
                                                
29 While scholars focus on various aspects of socialization, Merelman’s definition of political socialization 
is the most widely accepted (Sigel 1995). 
 26 
On the other hand, being surrounded by people with similar questions, needs, and 
motivations could actually facilitate political discussion and raise political awareness 
within the community. Thus, while residential concentration might impede the 
assimilation and acculturation processes in some ways, in other ways it might facilitate 
the flow of political information and enhance residents' political knowledge (Cho, 
Gimpel and Dyck 2006). 
To be clear, nativity itself is not the cause of low participation among Asian 
Americans; rather it suggests unique acculturation (for immigrants) and socialization (for 
their offspring) processes. Facing even more obstacles to political participation than the 
native-born, immigrants come with different cultural and political backgrounds. The 
classical liberalism and ethos of individualism underlying American constitutional 
democracy may not be familiar to new arrivals (Lien, Conway and Wong 2004). 
Conversely, U.S.-born Asian Americans do not struggle with the language and have been 
immersed in American political culture, and are thus more likely to become more 
politically active. Indeed, the behavioral patterns of those who have been in the U.S. for a 
longer period (for example, more than ten years) approximate those of the native-born 
(Ong and Scott 2009).30 Nevertheless, socialization experiences of U.S.-born Asian 
Americans may lack the content of American politics due to their parents’ limited 
repertoire.  
 
                                                
30 Surprisingly, Ong, Cruz-Viesca and Nakanishi (2008) found that naturalized Asian American citizens 
voted more than native-born Asian Americans in the 2006 midterm election (after accounting for margin of 
errors), using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and the 2006 November Current 
Population Survey (CPS). It is arguably possible that the naturalized Asians are at least politically active or 
interested enough to acquire their citizenship. A lack of evidence in this regard begs for additional data on 
the acculturation experiences among Asian immigrants and socialization experiences of the second and 
later generation Asian Americans. 
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ASIAN AMERICAN GROUP IDENTITY 
A sense of connection to a broader collective community and group 
consciousness from either personally experiencing discrimination or perceiving 
persecution or threats to the interests of one's racial or ethnic group may engender 
panethnic identification as a strategic response to the coercive forces (Portes and 
Rumbaut 1996; Masuoka and Rim 2007). In other words, personal experiences or the 
perception of discrimination due to one's race or ethnicity are key to a panethnic identity 
formation (Dawson 1994; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004). A panethnic identity—such as 
African Americans, Native American Indians, Hispanics, and Asian Americans— is a 
socially constructed label applied (or ascribed) to different groups with various cultural 
traditions and languages (Espiritu 1992). Racial discrimination can effectively activate 
group consciousness, which increases political involvement (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; 
Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004; Masuoka and Rim 2007).31 Supportive evidence has 
been found among African Americans (Dawson 1994) and Hispanics (Sanchez 2006), but 
how group identity for a highly diverse community, such as Asian Americans, affect 
group members’ participation is little known. 
Group identity engenders the social and cultural positions with which one has 
chosen to identify.32 While some Asians integrate or assimilate into the mainstream and 
embrace their “American” identity, some choose instead to identify themselves as 
                                                
31 Using the 2004 Survey of Asians in the Bay Area data, Masuoka and Rim (2007) find that Asian 
Americans (both foreign born and U.S.-born) who experienced first-hand discrimination or perceive 
discrimination against Asians as a problem in preventing Asians from succeeding were indeed more likely 
to prefer Asian American candidates. 
32 Some may contend that transnational ties between immigrants and their homelands may delay the 
acculturation process and thus prevent members of ethnic groups from integrating into the host society, 
resulting in lower levels of political participation (Zhou 2001, 199; Lien, Conway and Wong 2004, 21). 
Empirical evidence, nevertheless, shows otherwise (Lien, Conway and Wong 2004; Junn et al. 2008). 
Using the 2001-2001 five-metropolitan area data sets, Lien, Conway and Wong (2004) surprisingly found 
that neither prior participation in homeland politics, nor the interest and attention paid to homeland politics 
supported such a theoretical expectation. More recently, Junn et al. (2008) found that those who 
participated in their homelands were more likely to vote in the United States. One plausible explanation 
relies on the immigrants' previous socialization experiences in their countries of origin. Those who valued 
political participation are more likely to carry that belief from their homelands to the United States and to 
continue to practice it. 
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“Asian” or “ethnic only” (e.g., “Chinese,” or “Vietnamese”), and still others respond to 
the changing identity by creating a hybrid identity, such as “Chinese American“, or, more 
broadly, “Asian American”. Those who see themselves primarily as “American” may 
behave similar to members of the host society, while those who see themselves in more 
ethnic terms, such as “Korean”, may withdraw from American politics. 
I argue that identities acknowledging both their ancestral culture and their 
American-ness by connecting individuals to the collective community, which encourages 
them to participate in American politics. First, their American-ness reflects their (desires) 
to integrate into American society, in part by exercising their political rights and civic 
duties. Connecting to one’s own Asian or ethnic culture ties the individual to a broader 
minority community, a collective body; the sense of connectedness as well as her hybrid 
identity impress upon her the needs of the group. The absence of either elements of an 
“Asian (or ethnic) American” identity (i.e., “American” only or “Asian” only) can 
weaken the motivation to participate politically.  
 
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
Three hypotheses emerge from this discussion: 
First, the better acculturated and those who primarily identify as “Asian 
American” or “ethnic American” (such as “Chinese American”) are more likely to vote. 
Acculturation experiences and group identity play important role in political 
participation. The better acculturated tend to be aware of their political rights, civic 
obligation, and means by which they can participate. Thus the better acculturated are 
more likely to participate in the electoral process. Identities acknowledging one’s both 
American-ness and Asian-ness or ethnicity help to connect individuals to a broader but 
still limited community, and thus more likely to motivate Asian American voters to 
turnout. Their self-identified American-ness indicates them seeing themselves as party of 
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the political system, and the acknowledged Asian-ness or ethnicity helps to motivate 
them to act with a possible reference to the group’s needs and interests. While the 
underlying mechanism of what is activated by which element of their identity, or under 
what circumstances one primarily sees herself as “Asian American” or “ethnic 
American”, or merely “American” is beyond the scope of this project, if the 
aforementioned reasoning is true for Asian Americans, those who view themselves as 
“Asian American” or “ethnic American” will be more likely to vote. 
Second, the better acculturated Asian Americans are more likely to identify 
themselves as “Asian American” or “ethnic American.”  
As suggested above, the better acculturated Asian Americans are aware of 
changes in their surrounding environment, incorporate these changes in their behavior 
repertoire, and adapt to their new positions in the society (Berry 2005). If this were true 
for Asian Americans, the increased level of acculturation will lead to their embracement 
of American-ness as well as their Asian-ness or ethnicity. The adoption of American-ness 
in their identity implies their longing to be accepted in American society, indirectly 
acknowledging their inclusion of the political system, whereas the choice of Asian-ness 
or ethnicity implies their recognition of difference from the majority. Although the ethnic 
boundary may fade away over time and generations (Takaki 1989), the (pan-)ethnic 
categorization helps to foster a sense of belonging to a broader but unique community. As 
a result, the better acculturated Asian Americans are predicted to be more likely to view 
themselves as “Asian American” or “ethnic Americans.” 
Third, Asian Americans who feel a sense of connectedness to the Asian American 
community are more likely to identify as “Asian American.”  
The need for relations among human beings urges individuals to connect to 
communities, regardless of time, location, race, and ethnicity. Those who perceive 
commonality with members of a particular group are more likely to feel connected to that 
community. As a result, this sense of connection helps individuals to identify with the 
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group and possibly act upon the group’s interests. Thus, Asian Americans who feel 
connected to the Asian American community are likely to identify as “Asian American.” 
In addition, those who feel connected to other Asians may also primarily identify as 
“ethnic American.”33  
Fourth, those who experience racial and ethnic discrimination are more likely to 
acknowledge their uniqueness (such as Asian-ness or ethnicity) in their identity. 
Racial and ethnic discrimination experiences are likely to activate one’s identity 
against which the individual is held prejudices (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Incidents of 
racial and ethnic discrimination also facilitate the recognition of individuals’ differences 
from the mainstream as well as similarities with groups that share the specific trait. 
Therefore, racial and ethnic discrimination experiences among Asian Americans are 
predicted to have a positive impact on identifying with their own Asian-ness or ethnicity. 
Studies on group identity formation emphasize the process of acquiring a social 
identity related to group affinity, but little is known about how Asian American voters 
would react to Asian American candidates (except for Cho 2003; Lien, Conway, and 
Wong 2004; Collet 2005; Masuoka and Rim 2007; Lai 2011; Wong et al. 2011).34 Many 
expect that an in-group candidate (i.e., an Asian American candidate) will effectively 
energize the Asian community; however, the literature presents little direct empirical 
evidence of this phenomenon. 
                                                
33 While it is possible that those who interpret “other Asians” in ethnic term (e.g., Chinese respondents 
perceive “other Asians” as “other Chinese”) are more likely to identify as “ethnic American,” the data is 
limited in this regard of testing how individuals perceive the term used in the questionnaire, as well as the 
underlying mechanism or reasoning why one identifies as “Asian American” or “ethnic American.” 
34 Lien and her colleagues found that a majority of the sample in their Pilot National Asian American 
Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001, preferred an Asian American candidate when both candidates 
were equally qualified for the office, and among those, 14% would still vote for the Asian American 
candidate even if (s)he were less qualified. In their analysis, however, descriptive representation was not 
systematically examined. More recently, Masuoka and Rim find that foreign-born Asian Americans in Bay 
Area were more likely to support an Asian American candidate than their native-born counterparts. In 
addition, they found that for the foreign-born, those who perceived panethnic commonality among Asians 
preferred the Asian American candidate. For the native-born, while those who believed that the 
achievements of Asians gained too little public recognition preferred the Asian American candidate, those 
who shared a sense of minority group commonality (not panethnic commonality) were less likely to prefer 
Asian American candidates. 
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DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION OF ASIAN AMERICANS 
Political representation, symbolic or substantive, nowadays remains a major 
political goal for minorities.35 Sometimes, the pathway to claim a sense of belonging is 
through political power, making their political voices heard (Rustin 1971, 118; Kiang 
2001). Descriptive representation refers to the preference of groups to elect 
representatives with similar traits, while substantive representation refers to the group’s 
policy preferences being represented in the decision-making process, regardless of the 
officials’ racial and ethnic backgrounds.36 While I am interested in how Asian American 
elected officials reflect the attitudes and behaviors of Asian Americans in the policy-
making process (i.e., substantive representation), the relatively small number of elected 
Asian American officials at the national level makes it difficult to examine this dynamic. 
I therefore focus on descriptive (or symbolic) representation in the present study. In the 
case of Asian Americans, the question becomes, “Are Asian American voters more 
responsive to candidates with Asian backgrounds?”, or “Can Asian American candidates 
effectively energize Asian voters?” While investigating the effect of ethnic cues among 
Asians, one may also ask, “Do the ethnic cues operate universally among individual 
Asian voters?”  
It is important to reiterate the difference between political empowerment and 
descriptive representation theory. Scholars of political empowerment emphasize not only 
political representation (symbolic or substantive), but also substantial influence of the 
group in decision-making process (Bobo and Gilliam 1990, 378). While both theories 
consider race and ethnicity as contextual cues of likely policy responsiveness that 
encourages voters of that group to value participation, political empowerment is more as 
                                                
35 In the present study, I use descriptive representation interchangeably with symbolic representation. 
36 Pitkin (1967) defines substantive representation, in contrast to descriptive or symbolic representation, as 
representation linked with activities enacted for the represented. 
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the consequence of descriptive (Pantoja and Segura 2003)37 and substantive 
representation. In this project, I focus on descriptive representation instead of political 
empowerment. 
To examine whether descriptive representation theory holds universally for Asian 
Americans, I test two hypotheses: 
First, Asian American voters turn out at higher rates when an Asian American 
candidate contests the office, especially when (a) the Asian American candidate is 
coethnic (meaning that the candidate and the voter are of the same ethnicity), and/or (b) 
the Asian American candidate’s ethnic tie is long standing or generational.  
Ethnic cues influence voters’ decisions because voters use available cues to infer 
more about the candidate. For example, seeing an Asian American candidate leads the 
voter to feel that the candidate is probably similar to herself, or to infer that the candidate 
values what the voter values, or shares the voter’s interests and needs.  
Second, racial and ethnic cues operate with particular effectiveness among those 
who were previously less engaged in politics. 
These cues, however, can be more influential among those who are less informed 
or engaged in politics. After all, people only react to political events to the extent that 
they are aware of political affairs (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). More to the point, 
Popkin (1994) and Lupia (1994) demonstrate that most voters do not have a consistent 
and sophisticated political ideology, and therefore rely on shortcuts when asked to 
register an opinion about politics. If voters do not have sufficient information to make a 
decision, racial and ethnic cues will come in especially handy, but for those who are more 
politically engaged, racial and ethnic backgrounds are merely one more piece of factual 
information. In other words, if this were true, the lack of ethnic cues for Asian American 
voters may have contributed to their low turnout rate. 
                                                
37 For instance, in order to measure the effect of political empowerment on individual political orientation 
or behavior for a particular group, that group should have already successfully elected one of their own to 
offices. 
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In summary, I propose that the lower levels of political participation among Asian 
Americans result from their acculturation experiences and their views of self. Although 
Asian Americans are the fastest growing group in the United States, the strength in their 
numbers does not correspond to higher political participation. Descriptive representation 
predicts the effectiveness of racial and ethnic cues in energizing Asian voters. I further 
argue that the impact of ethnic cues depends on the level of previous political 
engagement. In the next section, I outline the data collection methods and empirical 
analysis used in this research. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
I first examine the relationship between socioeconomic status and turnout rates by 
race and ethnic origin at the group level (Chapter Three). As mentioned earlier, turnout 
rates are strongly influenced by education and income levels among non-Hispanic 
Whites, African Americans, and Hispanics, but not among Asian Americans at the 
aggregate level. To understand the uniqueness of Asian American participation in the 
United States, I outline the political structure that regulates their entrance, followed by a 
historical description of the contours of Asian American turnout rates, using the 2000 
U.S. Census data and the Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008.  
The Census and the CPS data, which include basic demographics such as detailed 
educational attainment and family income levels, gender, and citizenship attainment, 
allow me to draw comparisons of these variables across major racial and ethnic groups. 
The empirical aggregate estimation of Asian American turnout shows the disconnect 
between the theoretical predictions of Asian American political participation and reality 
by comparing socioeconomic status and turnout rates for Asian Americans and other 
racial and ethnic groups, with a focus on the 2008 presidential election cycle. While the 
socioeconomic status model does not hold for the aggregate pattern among Asian 
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Americans, at the individual level it is the case that the more educated and the wealthier 
Asian Americans are more likely to vote than the less educated and the poor, especially 
among the U.S.-born Asian Americans. In other words, the issue is not only the intercept 
but also the slope (the effect of socioeconomic status on political participation). Even 
though there is an increasing public and scholarly interest in Asian Americans, Asian 
American turnout still lagged behind non-Hispanic Whites and African Americans. The 
continual population growth as well as the disjoint between theories of Asian political 
participation and turnout clearly call for further investigation. 
Chapter Four explores the impact of acculturation experiences on group identity 
and turnout using the Pilot of National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS) data 
conducted by Lien, Conway, and Wong in 2000-2001 in the metropolitan areas of 
Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, and San Francisco, using telephone 
interviews (N=1,218). The PNAAPS was the first large-n Asian American sample 
collected that included several variables considered important in conventional 
explanations of political participation. Residency and language use serve as proxy 
measures of acculturation experiences. In addition, specific questions pertaining to shared 
fate with other Asians, shared culture, and discrimination experiences measure a sense of 
group connectedness that facilitates the formation of “Asian American” or “ethnic 
American” identity. To analyze the effect of acculturation on group identity and turnout, 
as well as the effect of group identity on turnout, I also control for important 
demographics such as birthplace (nativity or U.S. born status), ethnicity, age, education, 
income, gender, and strength of partisanship. 
Furthermore, to gain insight into Asian American acculturation experiences and 
group identity, I conducted fifteen in-depth interviews with Asian American voters, 
elites, and activists in the Austin area in Texas. Participants were recruited through a 
snowball sampling method, relying on references from initial contacts. On average, each 
interview lasted ninety minutes or so. The interviews not only supplement the empirical 
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analysis of Chapter Four, but also inform an original survey-based experiment that tested 
the effect of racial and ethnic cues on Asian American participation. 
Seeking to fill a gap in the existing research on political representation and 
participation, Chapter Five examines the extent to which the descriptive representation 
theory holds for Asian American voters, using data from an original survey-based 
experiment. In this experiment, I presented a hypothetical city council campaign to 
survey respondents, manipulating two things in the script. The first-level treatment 
involved varying the nationality of the candidate. The second-level treatment involved 
identifying the country of origin of the candidate’s parents, with an eye towards 
increasing the connection of the candidate to any underlying sense of connection with the 
“home” country. In the control group, two candidates with common American names 
were presented to participants. After the statement, participants were asked to report the 
likelihood of voting if the election were held tomorrow. Participants were recruited 
through on-campus flyers, and server lists associated with Asian Americans (such as the 
Center of Asian American Studies, Asian Round Table, Vietnamese Students 
Association, Asian American Campus Ministry, and other Asian fraternity and sorority 
groups). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the five groups. Upon completion 
of the survey, respondents were each given $10 compensation for their time and effort. 
An independent pilot study confirmed the random assignment and manipulation check. 
Last, Chapter Six revisits the puzzle that motivates the project, questions 
addressed, arguments proposed, and hypotheses tested in the study with a summary of 
major findings. Finally, I conclude the study by presenting an agenda for future research 




In this chapter I have examined a variety of common explanations for political 
participation as they apply to Asian Americans, and developed research hypotheses for 
understanding how acculturation processes affect group identity, which conditions 
participation. Specifically, I propose that political participation among Asian Americans 
results from their acculturation experiences and their views of selves. To energize Asian 
voters, descriptive representation predicts the effectiveness of racial and ethnic cues. This 
impact of ethnic cues, however, is contingent on the level of one’s previous political 
engagement. These hypotheses, if true, would represent a major step forward in our 
ability to explain and predict immigrant group participation.
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CHAPTER THREE: Asian American Political Participation In The 
Twenty-First Century 
 
“Although their socioeconomic profile compares to that of whites in California, 
Asian turnout still lags that of whites by more than 20 percentage points, about the same 
percentage as the Latino turnout deficit.”—“When the Sleeping Giant is Awake,” Jack 
Citrin, California Journal, 2002 (December). 
 
As the “awakening giant” metaphor used by scholars (Citrin 2002; Ong, Cruz-
Viesca, and Nakanishi 2008) and the media (Reang 2000) indicates Asian American 
political involvement is slowly on the rise. Though Asian voters as a whole rarely catch 
the attention of the national media, their residential concentration in certain regions and 
states occasionally draws the local media spotlight. As often as not, this attention is 
because of unexpected behavior or results. For instance, the striking support for Hillary 
Clinton in the 2008 Democratic primary in California from Asian voters (71 percent),38 
the electoral victories of three Chinese Americans in Supervisory Board Elections in San 
Francisco (MSNBC 2009),39 and the more general success of Asian American candidates 
in at-large municipal elections (Lai 2011). 
As a consequence of these and other results, scholars have started to disentangle 
contextual effects on Asian American political action. Outside of California, turnout rates 
among Asian Americans (specifically, Chinese, Koreans, Japanese, and Indians) decrease 
as the percentages of co-ethnic immigrants in the neighborhoods increase, especially 
where Asians are geographically concentrated (Cho, Gimpel and Dyck 2006). Context is 
therefore particularly shaped by the local native-born and immigrant populations—these 
populations constrain the information flow and thus greatly affect political 
communication in these locations. This spatial dependence also exists in the form of 
                                                
38 Results of MSNBC exit poll at California (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21225970/) (Last date of 
access: April 23, 2010)  
39 “Asian-American Political Profile Rising in U.S.” (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28721167/) (Last date 
of access: October 6, 2006)  
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ethnic campaign contribution networks (Cho 2003). For example, Asian Americans in the 
Pacific States deliver significantly more than their share in campaign contributions. By 
contrast, Asian Americans in Northeast States are much less invovled.  
Such spatial patterns also exist over time in registration and voting. Asian voters 
in the West,40 compared to other regions, were more active in the 2008 presidential race 
(File and Crissey 2010). The registration rate of the Asian voters in the West was 60 
percent, followed by the Midwest (58 percent), the South (52 percent), and the Northeast 
(46 percent). With respect to voting, Asian voters in the West (53 percent) and Midwest 
(48 percent) reportedly voted at the highest levels, while the South (43 percent) and 
Northeast (40 percent) were lower.41 
This chapter documents the disconnection between Asian American 
socioeconomic status and their political participation. Specifically, I address the 
following questions: To what degree is Asian turnout lower than that of other racial and 
ethnic groups in the twenty-first century? Is there any pattern to Asian American turnout 
over time? 
I focus on the most contemporary election cycles (2000-2008) for two reasons. 
First, the Office of Management and Budget in 1997 announced new standards for racial 
classification in Census due to the prominent changes in the population’s racial and 
ethnic makeup since 1977. For the sake of consistency, I therefore focus on turnout levels 
by racial and ethnic groups since 2000. Second, upon the execution of the study, the 
                                                
40 Regions are defined by the Census Bureau as following: West includes Mountain States (Arizona, 
Colorado, Idaho, New Mexico, Montana, Utah, Nevada, and Wyoming) and Pacific States (Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington); Midwest includes East North Central States (Indiana, 
Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and West North Central States (Iowa, Kansa, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota); South includes South Atlantic States (Delaware, 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West 
Virginia), East South Central States (Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee), and West South 
Central States (Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas); Northeast includes New England States 
(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont) and Middle Atlantic 
States (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania). 
41 The report on “Registration and Voting in the Election of November 2008” is available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20-562.pdf. (Last date of access: March 21, 2012). 
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Current Population Survey made information on self-reported voting and registration by 
demographics available for 2000 and beyond, but not before.  
To answer my substantive questions, I compare Asian registration and turnout 
rates to those of other racial and ethnic groups. In particular, I take a closer look at the 
relationships between demographics and turnout rates by race and ethnicity in the 2008 
presidential election cycle. These comparisons show the disconnection between Asian 
American political participation and the expectation based on their education and income 
levels. They also show a slight upward trajectory for Asian American political 
participation. But while Asian turnout—similar turnout among non-Hispanic Whites, 
African Americans, and Hispanics—shows a marginal increase over time, the turnout 
gaps among racial and ethnic groups persist. This gap, at the individual level, exists not 
only in the intercepts, but also the slopes (magnitudes of education and income effects on 
turnout) across racial and ethnic groups in the 2008 presidential election cycle. 
Comparisons of registration and voting rates also demonstrate that registration poses a 
significant challenge to Asians and Hispanics with respect to translating their numerical 
strength into political power. To understand the causes of the participation gap and the 
potential for change, I begin by outlining the political structure of immigration in the 
United States. 
 
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
Immigration laws impose powerful structural forces upon those seeking to enter 
the United States (Haney Lόpez 1996, 39; Ngai 2004, 5). The interactions between 
existing residents and newly arrivals result in the public’s acceptance of or resistance 
against newcomers. In response to public sentiments, the government regulates who can 
enter the country and how they may do so. Regarding Asians, regulations often have 
involved institutionalized discrimination. 
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The first Asian group to migrate to the U.S. in large number was the Chinese, due 
to a constant demand for Chinese labor in railroad construction, agriculture, and 
manufacturing (Takaki 1998, 28). The growing Chinese population in the United States, 
however, began to pose a threat to the native-born working laborers, particularly during 
the 1870s, when the Far West was experiencing tremendous economic hardship. The 
resulting social tension eventually convinced the U.S. Congress to restrict the legal 
entrance of Chinese laborers (111).  
The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act suspended Chinese immigrant laborers from 
entering the country, and later the 1917 Immigration Act created “an Asiatic barred 
Zone,” which prohibited all Asians from immigrating to the United States (Haney Lόpez 
1996, 37-38). The complete exclusion of Asians was softened by the 1924 Immigration 
Act, which differentiated people by nationality and ranked them in a hierarchy of 
desirability (Ngai 1999). This effectively created a restrictive quota system targeting 
Asians. In fact, the severe entrance barriers for Asians were not appreciably loosened 
until 1965 (Wong 2006, 20). 
The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the Hart-Cellar Act, 
replaced the national origins quota system with a preference system that focused on three 
categories: skilled professionals, family reunifications, and political refugees. As a result, 
post-1965 immigrants largely consisted of non-Europeans, particularly Latin Americans 
and Asians with profession skills or relations in the U.S. Consequently, more recent 
immigrants (especially Asians) are relatively better educated and wealthier than their 
precedents (Lai 2011). 
Today, the dominant characteristic of the Asian American population is its rapid 
growth. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the racial diversity of the United States 
has become more pronounced in the last few decades, as the number and percentage of 
immigrants from non-European countries has increased drastically since 1970. Between 
1970 and 1980, Asian and Pacific Islanders were the nation’s fastest-growing population, 
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with a rate of increase of 128 percent (from 1.5 million in 1970 to 3.5 million in 1980).42 
Entering the twenty-first century, Asians continue to be the fastest growing population in 
the nation.43 Between 2000 and 2010, the Asian alone population grew faster than any 
other racial and ethnic group, increasing by 43 percent (from 10.2 million in 2000 to 14.7 
million in 2010). Their numerical change is only next to the Hispanic population (from 
35.5 million in 2000 to 50.5 million in 2010).44 
This demographic shift has the potential to dramatically alter the American 
political climate (Judis and Teixeira 2002), leaving Asian Americans as a powerful 
constituency group (Espiritu 1992, 54). This is particularly true in the western states, 
where one-half of Asian Americans reside, usually in the metropolitan areas (Reeves and 
Bennett 2003), but increasingly in suburban areas (Lai 2011). According to the 2008 
Census estimates of the resident population by race and Hispanic origin, the states with 
the highest percentage of Asians are Hawaii (39.3 percent), California (12.5 percent), 
New Jersey (7.7 percent), New York (7.0 percent), and Washington (6.7 percent).45 At 
the local level, New York, Los Angeles, San Jose, San Francisco, and Honolulu46 were 
ranked as the five metropolitan areas with the largest Asian populations in 2000 (Barnes 
and Bennett 2002). The suburbanization of the Asian American population (Lai 2011) is 
driven by higher-ranked school districts, affordable housing, and pre-existing social 
networks. These areas also provide a more fertile ground to realize political 
                                                
42 “We the Americans: Asians” (September, 1993) (http://www.census.gov/apsd/wepeople/we-3.pdf) (Last 
date of access: April 23, 2010). Race Data on Asian and Pacific Islanders 
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race/ppl-184.html) (Last date of access: April 23, 2010) 
43 “National Population Projections,” Jennifer Cheeseman Day 
(http://www.census.gov/population/www/pop-profile/natproj.html) (Last date of access: July 27, 2011) 
44 “Overview of Race and Hispanic Origin: 2010” by Karen R. Humes, Nicholas A. Jones, and Roberto R. 
Ramirez, March 2011 (http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-02.pdf). (Last date of access: 
March 30, 2012) 
45  State Rankings—Statistical Abstract of the United States (Asian Population Alone, Percent) July 2008 
(http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/ranks/rank08.html) (Last date of access: July 27, 2011). 
Compared to the 2000 Census data, Asian alone population in the continental United States has grown in 
the four states: California (10.9 percent in 2000), New Jersey (5.7 percent), New York (5.5 percent), and 
Washington (5.5 percent) (Barnes and Bennett 2002). 
46 Honolulu is a census designated place and is not legally incorporated. 
 42 
representation, although little is known about the causes and political consequences of 
Asian American suburbanization.47 
 
THE STRENGTH OF NUMBER BY RACE AND HISPANIC ORIGIN 
The Current Population Survey (CPS) is a “monthly survey of about 50,000 
households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.”48 
Its primary goal is to describe the labor force characteristics of the U.S. population. The 
voting supplement used here does not, unfortunately, provide estimates of partisanship. 
Both measurements of registration and voting are self-reported. 
Voting in the United States is a two-step process: registration and turnout. 
Population size is only a precursor, as only citizens are allowed to cast votes. In 2008, 
citizens comprised 91 percent of the voting age population. The rates of adult citizens to 
voting-age population vary remarkably by race and ethnicity. For example, 98 percent of 
voting age non-Hispanic Whites (“Whites” in the following) are citizens, as are 94 
percent of voting-age Blacks. For Hispanics and Asians,49 the percentages are 63 percent 
and 68 percent, respectively. The percentages for the entire U.S. population, Whites, and 
Blacks remained stable from 2000 to 2008 (Figure 3-1), while the percentage for 
Hispanics varied but without a discernible trend. Note that only the percentage among 
Asians increased, growing from 59 percent in 2000 to 68 percent in 2008, and even 
surpassing that of Hispanics. The change in the percentage suggests a distinct increase in 
potential political power for Asian voters. 
[Figure 3-1 — Ratios of Adult Citizens to Voting Age Population 
                                                
47 While Lai (2011) examines political representation of Asian Americans in city councils, his analysis 
does not empirically test the effects of ethnic media, community-based organization, schools, and local 
economy on Asian American political representation or participation. 
48  Detailed description about Voting and Registration Supplement is available at 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/index.html (Last date of access: July 27, 2011). 
49 “Asians” refers to those reported as “Asian” alone, not in combination. As a result, the analysis here 
reveals a more conservative view with respect to the strength of the Asian American political force 
compared to including “Asian in combination.” 
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by Race and Hispanic Origin] 
Across all racial and ethnic groups, Whites show a small but consistent decline in 
citizen population size, while the Hispanic community increased by 2 percentage points 
from 2000 (7 percent) to 2008 (9 percent) (Table 3-1). For Blacks and Asians, their 
contribution to the adult citizens population remained stable (12 percent and 3 percent, 
respectively).  
[Table 3-1 — The Composition of Adult Citizens in the United States] 
Nationally, the average registration rate was above 70 percent during presidential 
election years, but lower in congressional election years (Figure 3-2). Differences in voter 
registration across racial and ethnic groups remained across time. For instance, Whites 
and Blacks (seven out of ten) were most likely to register, followed by Hispanics (six out 
of ten), and Asians (five out of ten) in presidential elections. 
[Figure 3-2 — Registration Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin] 
Each racial group showed a consistent increase in both registration rates and 
voting rates in presidential elections over time (Figure 3-2, 3-3). Though Asian voters 
were the smallest group in the U.S. population compared to other major racial and ethnic 
groups, they were at least as active as Hispanic voters. Still, Whites were most likely to 
vote, followed by Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians (Figure 3-3). For presidential elections, 
the turnout rate of the general population increased 4 percentage points from 2000 (60 
percent) to 2004 (64 percent) and remained stable in 2008, despite purported enthusiasm 
about the 2008 race. Although first-time eligible voters participated at higher levels in 
2008 than in previous years, some other groups such as White supporters of the 
Republican Party chose to stay home on the election day (U.S. Census Bureau 2009c).50  
 [Figure 3-3 — Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin] 
                                                
50 For a more detailed analysis, see Yen 2009. 
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Registration appears to be the main hurdle to voting across groups. A majority of 
registered voters turn out to vote (Figure 3-4), regardless of race and ethnicity. Among 
registrants, turnout increased from 2004 to 2008 across all groups, with Black voters 
leading the way (87% in 2004 to 93% in 2008). For the first time, turnout among Black 
registrants surpassed that of Whites (by 3 percent). Senator Obama’s presence and 
charisma (and race) undoubtedly explains this distinct increase. Hispanic (84%) and 
Asian (86%) registrants showed up at polls at a slightly higher rate, though still falling 
behind Blacks and Whites.  
The gap in racial and ethnic group turnout rates has narrowed over time (Figure 3-
4). This suggests that registration requirements are a significant roadblock to Asian and 
Hispanic political power. The marginal increase in Hispanic and Asian turnout reflects 
the growing consciousness derived from the expanding size of the two communities or 
perhaps increased party outreach. The data, however, are silent on this point. 
[Figure 3-4 — Voting Rates among the Registered by Race and Hispanic Origin] 
To better understand Asian American participation in contemporary American 
politics, in the next section I take a closer look at the relationships between 
demographics, registration and turnout by race and ethnicity in the 2008 presidential 
election. I am particularly interested in whether socioeconomic status predicts turnout 
within the Asian American population. If it does, then we know that the classic baseline 
model of political participation works at the individual-level, even as it mis-predicts the 
aggregate-level behavior for Asian Americans. 
 
THE 2008 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Comparisons of demographics and voting rates across race and ethnicity clearly 
illustrate the disconnection between Asian turnout and the conventional wisdom (Table 
3-2, 3-3). In 2008, Whites and Asians had the highest levels of educational attainment 
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and income, far surpassing the national average (Table 3-2). For instance, one-third of 
White and 47 percent of Asian adult citizens had a bachelor’s degree or above, compared 
to 27 percent of U.S. adult citizens, 17 percent of Blacks, and 14 percent of Hispanics. 
Similar patterns were found with respect to family income. More than one-fifth of Whites 
(22 percent) and almost one-third of Asians (29 percent) had a family income of 
$100,000 or above, while less than one-tenth of Blacks (8 percent) and only 12 percent of 
Hispanics did.  
Regarding nativity, the Hispanic and Asian populations were largely comprised of 
immigrants (Table 3-2). More than half of Asian adult citizens (62 percent) were 
immigrants, compared to the national average of 7 percent, 3% for Whites, 6% for 
Blacks, and 26% for Hispanics. Since substantial research suggests that the greatest 
challenge for foreign-born immigrants is language (Cho 1999; Farkas et al. 2003), we 
know that more than half of Asian voters must overcome the language barrier in order to 
acquaint themselves with the political system.  
Had socioeconomic status effectively forecast turnout level, one would expect 
Asians to be the most politically active racial/ethnic group in the U.S. Comparisons of 
voting rates by demographics and groups, however, dispute this prediction (Table 3-3). In 
addition, Table 3-3 further elucidates that Asian voters have not yet fully overcome the 
language barrier necessary to assume the political clout commensurate with their 
numbers. 
[Table 3-2 — Demographics by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2008] 
The survey data clearly indicate that Whites and Blacks are more politically active 
than Hispanics and Asians in the 2008 presidential election (Table 3-3). Seven out of ten 
White or Black adult citizens turned out to vote, but only five out of ten Hispanics or 
Asians did so. Interestingly, women were more politically involved than men in the 2008 
presidential election, except among Asians. The voting rates of Asian women in 
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presidential elections, in fact, remained at the same levels as those of Asian men since 
2000.51 
With respect to socioeconomic status, the results show a positive correlation 
between educational attainment/family income and voting rates, but perhaps not as much 
for Asians. Among those with bachelor’s degree, Whites (79 percent) and Blacks (76 
percent) are the most politically active at polls, followed by Hispanics (70 percent) and 
Asians (57 percent) with remarkable gaps. This relationship is also observed between 
annual family income and voting rates. Among those with a higher family income than 
$100,000, eight out of ten Whites or Blacks voted, seven out of Hispanics voted, but only 
six out of Asians voted in 2008. 
[Table 3-3 — Voting Rates in the 2008 Presidential Election by Demographics] 
Although education and income fail to explain Asian American turnout at the 
aggregate level, both factors still have positive effects for Asian American turnout at the 
individual level (Figure 3-5 and 3-6).52 I estimate effects of education and income on 
turnout at the individual level using the 2008 CPS data (only for adult citizens), while 
controlling for gender, age, and nativity. 53 Figure 3-5 and 3-6 highlight the differences 
and similarities between Asian Americans and other racial and ethnic groups. (See the 
Appendix A for complete results for each racial and ethnic group.) 
First, there is no difference in turnout among Asians and Whites at the lower level 
of socioeconomic status. Second, significant differences of voting probability are more 
prominent at higher levels of education and income. Socioeconomic status obviously has 
                                                
51 According to the CPS data, in 2000, the voting rate for male Asians and Pacific Islanders was 26 percent, 
for females it was 25 percent; in 2002, the voting rate for male Asians and Pacific Islanders was 20 percent, 
for females it was 19 percent; in 2004, the voting rate for males reported as Asian alone was 29 percent, for 
females it was 31 percent. The only exception of equal voting rate for both male and female Asians was in 
the 2006 midterm election: 30 percent for males and 34 percent for females. 
52 Both education and income also have positive effects on registration for all racial and ethnic groups. The 
slope (the magnitude of the effect), however, do not significantly vary across groups. Results are not 
presented, but available upon request. 
53 As mentioned earlier, the CPS data does not include variables on partisanship. Therefore, partisanship is 
not controlled in the baseline model. 
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an effect on turnout, and such effect is much greater for Whites (and Blacks) than for 
Asian Americans.54 Even though we do not observe such patter at the aggregate level, the 
positive force of education and income undoubtedly exists for Asians at the individual 
level as well. However, effects of education and income are more limited for Asian 
Americans than for Whites.  
For instance, the probability of voting for a White middle-age (30-64 years old) 
U.S.-born male who has less than first grade level of education (the minimal education) is 
14%; the probability of voting for a White middle age U.S.-born male who has a Ph. D. 
(the maximal education) is 95%. The probability of voting for an Asian middle-age U.S.-
born male who has less than first grade level of education is 21%; the probability of 
voting for a Asian middle age U.S.-born male who has a Ph. D. is 81%. In other words, 
the maximal effect of education on Whites is 81-percent increase in turnout, but 
significantly less (60 percentage points) on Asians. Similarly, the maximal effect of 
income on turnout is greater among Whites (35 percentage points increase) than Asians 
(20 percentage point increase).55 
In addition, Blacks appear to be the most politically active group, all else being 
equal. By contrast, Asian Americans and Hispanics are not only less politically engaged, 
their participation level is also less affected by education and income. However, there is 
still noticeable difference between Hispanics and Asian Americans at higher levels of 
income. For instance, the maximal change in probability of voting (in corresponding to 
the maximal change in income levels) for a Latino who was born in the U.S. at his middle 
age with a high school or equivalent diploma is 30% (from 39% at an income of less than 
$5,000 to 69% at more than $150,000). Plainly put, the marginal increase in voting 
                                                
54 Results of comparing coefficients of education for Whites-Asians (χ2=40.51, p < 0.001) and Blacks-
Asians (χ2=4.44, p < 0.05) are significant at least at the 0.05 level. On the other hand, effects of education 
on registration for different group are not significantly different from one another. 
55 The calculation is conditioned on a U.S.-born middle-age male who has a high school or equivalent 
diploma. 
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probability for Asian Americans is smaller than any other racial and ethnic group. Even 
at the maximal levels of education (Ph. D.) and income (more than $150,000), Asian 
Americans’ turnout (85%) is still significantly lower than Whites and Blacks (both 97%), 
and even slightly lower than Hispanics (89%).56 
[Figure 3-5 Predicated Probability of Voting by Education, Race and Ethnicity] 
 [Figure 3-6 Predicted Probability of Voting by Income, Race and Ethnicity] 
The aforementioned evidence indicates that socioeconomic resources are a factor 
in turnout for Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics, but much less so for Asians. The last three 
rows in Table 3-3 may contribute to understanding this conundrum. For instance, the 
effect of education is approximately the same across racial and ethnic groups after 
controlling for nativity (Figure 3-7 and 3-8). There is no difference in the slope of 
education effect between foreign-born Whites and Asians, or U.S.-born Whites and 
Asians. However, education has a greater impact on turnout among the U.S.-born Asian 
Americans than their foreign-born counterpart. This gap suggests factors beyond 
socioeconomic status are also in play for Asian American turnout. 
[Figure 3-7 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (Foreign-born)] 
[Figure 3-8 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (U.S.-born)] 
The U.S.-born in general are more electorally involved than the naturalized. This 
fact holds true for Whites and Blacks, but does not apply to Hispanics and Asians, for 
whom the voting rates of the U.S.-born were lower than their naturalized counterparts 
(Table 3-3). The seemingly counter-intuitive finding may be attributed to the appreciation 
of democratic values from immigrants—voluntary immigrants usually seek for better 
opportunity in an environment that deserves their respect and efforts (Citrin, Wong, and 
Duff 2001), or immigrants’ eagerness to exercise their political rights. 
                                                
56 The calculation is conditioned on a U.S.-born middle-age male. 
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There are three possible causes of the turnout gap between Asians and Hispanics 
versus Whites and Blacks. First, among immigrants, the major difference between the 
U.S.-born and the naturalized lies in the socialization and acculturation processes. The 
U.S.-born are more likely to have English as their native language, while the naturalized 
acquire English proficiency later. In addition, the U.S.-born are more likely to receive 
their main education in the U.S., through which they learn about the American history 
and political system. On the contrary, the naturalized need to study these subjects in order 
to obtain their American citizenship. This implies that the naturalized is more likely to 
face the registration hurdle (where, when, and how) than the U.S.-born. The above 
differences are likely to result in a disparity in the political behaviors between different 
generations. However, the post-1965 newcomers’ offspring, compared to their 
predecessors, are usually better educated and wealthier. Perhaps a sense of complacency 
resulted in the low level of turnout among Hispanics and Asians at the group level (Lai 
2011) and has delayed the attainment of political equality among Hispanics and Asians. 
While resources are less of a concern for Asian voters than others (Table 3-2),57 
registration appears to be a major barrier. Even among the registered, however, the voting 
rate for Asians has been lower than for Whites and Blacks. Collectively, these facts are 
puzzling; Asian Americans as a group show a lower level of electoral participation at the 
national level than other racial and ethnic groups, and their numerical strength has not 
effectively translated into political power. Traditional explanations of democratic 
mobilization (e.g., Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) seem to require expansion or 
even amendment. 
 
                                                
57 This is not to say that Asian Americans are exempted from poverty. For instance, according the Census 
Bureau, though fewer Asian Americans (13%) than Blacks (26%) and Hispanics (25%) living in poverty in 
2010, the proportion is slightly larger than non-Hispanic Whites (9%) (Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2011). 
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CONCLUSION 
This chapter presents an overview of Asian American political participation in the 
twenty-first century. Specifically, I compare Asian registration and turnout rates to those 
of other racial and ethnic groups. I then take a closer look at the relationships between 
demographics and political participation by race and ethnicity in the last presidential 
election cycle. The comparisons demonstrate the disconnection between Asian turnout in 
theory and in reality, and show the gap between promise and reality for Asian American 
political participation.  
Not all the news is dismal. The marginal increases in Hispanic and Asian turnout 
in 2008 perhaps reflects the growing consciousness promoted by grass-root organizations 
that accompany the expanding electorates. And in general, the American population is 
more and more politically engaged. Though the political disparity among groups remains 
in the contemporary American politics, the gaps are slowly shrinking. 
Comparisons of registration and voting rates also demonstrate that registration 
poses a significant challenge to Asians and Hispanics in translating their numerical 
strength into political power. Upon completion of voter registration, Asian Americans 
appear to be only slightly less active than Whites and Blacks, but not than Hispanics. 
Unlike other groups, the Asian American population comprises a majority of foreign-
born immigrants who are likely to appreciate the democratic values (Citrin, Wong, and 
Duff 2001), and need time to overcome language barriers and acquire knowledge about 
the American political system. The lack of Asian American political participation could 
be attributable to limited English proficiency (Cho 1999; Farkas et al. 2003), parents’ 
lack of political knowledge (Wong and Tseng 2008), and possibly a sense of 
complacency among the offspring of the post-1965 immigrants (Lai 2011). These 
inevitably depress Asian American political engagement. 
Finally, one major challenge for studying Asian American political participation 
is the group’s highly diverse ethnic makeup as well as their distinct historical trajectories 
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in the United States. Largely constituted of immigrants from a wide range of Asian 
countries, for Asian Americans to act as a political bloc, they have to bring all subgroups 
together under a big umbrella. One important question, then, is “to what extent and by 
what means individual Asian Americans connect to the larger Asian American 
community resulting in a (pan)ethnic identity?” Another is “How does this group 
identity, such as ‘Asian American’ or ‘ethnic American,’ affect their turnout?” To better 
understand the effect of acculturation, cause and effect of group identity, the next chapter 




CHAPTER FOUR: Effects Of Acculturation And Group Connectedness On 
Turnout Among Asian Americans 
 
“ ‘It will still take a little while to get to the same place as other minority groups,’ said 
Frank Y. Liu, a law professor at Duquesne University and former president of the Organization 
of Chinese-Americans. … ‘Asian-Americans, because of their cultural background, it takes them 
a while to really assert themselves as being American.’ ”— “Asian-Americans, Long Dormant 
Politically, Are Starting to Flex Their Muscles at the Polls.” Philippe Shepnick. 1998, October 
14. The Hill 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, traditional SES-based models of political participation have 
failed to explain the behavior of the burgeoning Asian American population.58 Although status is 
highly correlated with participation rates for Blacks and, to a lesser degree, Latinos, it is 
unrelated to Asian American participation at the aggregate level. The failure is especially 
noticeable because with the relaxation of immigration laws in 1965, quota preferences have 
effectively lured educated and wealthy Asians to the U.S. We are thus in need of alternative 
causal mechanisms. The size of foreign born among Asian Americans suggests that the majority 
of this population is still going through the process of adjustment and adaptation. In this chapter I 
focus on the effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on turnout.  
Previous research shows that the process of acculturation affects how immigrants adjust 
to new environments (Lien 1994; Rudmin 2003; Berry 2005).59 The postulated reason for this is 
simple: acculturation experiences and connection to the group help to cultivate one’s group 
                                                
58 Lien (1994) conceptualizes acculturation, group identity, ethnic ties, alienation, and deprivation as the 
multidimensional ethnicity while comparing the relations between “ethnicity” and political participation among 
Asian Americans and Mexican Americans. After controlling for these multi-dimensions, Lien finds that 
socioeconomic resources are still in play among Mexican Americans, but not among Asian Americans. 
59 Berry (2005, 698, 699) defines “acculturation” as “the dual process of cultural and psychological change that 
takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups and their individual members.” In particular, 
at the individual level, acculturation involves “changes in a person's behavioral repertoire.” During this 
acculturation, individuals may adopt different strategies such as integration (in which each cultural communities 
engage each other resulting in mutual acceptance and forging a hybrid identity), assimilation (individuals 
unconditionally conforming to the dominant culture and identity in the host society), separation (individuals 
withdraw from the dominant culture and cling to their own heritage culture and identity), and marginalization 
(individuals not only being unable to maintain heritage culture and identity, but also separating from the dominant 




identity in the present context resulting in the individual’s behavior (Figure 4-1). The better 
integrated are likely to feel accepted by the society as a whole resulting in a sense of security and 
comfort in partaking political activities. But we know little about how this works for Asian 
Americans and whether or not variation in acculturation accounts for group identity and turnout 
among this group.  
[Figure 4-1 About Here: Conceptual Framework] 
To understand what factors drive Asian American participation, this chapter examines the 
effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on turnout among Asian 
Americans. I begin by establishing the relations between the above variables, follow by 
describing the data and method, proceed to a presentation of the multivariate analysis, and 
conclude with a discussion of the political implications of the findings.  
 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION, ACCULTURATION, GROUP CONNECTEDNESS, AND GROUP 
IDENTITY 
Acculturation is defined as the degree to which one adapts to the present environment. 
The adoption of an “American” identity implies the acceptance and endorsement of the core 
values in American culture. Personal interviews of Chinese immigrants’ offspring conducted for 
this project suggest that this notion may be taking hold among Asian Americans. (See Appendix 
B for detailed backgrounds of interviewees.) For instance, W.L. (identified as “Chinese 
American”) offered that his father strongly believed in individualism and freedom, which he 
considered the “American Dream.” In his opinion, this was what connected his father (and 
himself) to America. Past studies have found that someone who embraces his “American-ness” 
would be more likely to vote, implying that the better integrated tend to be more politically 
active (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001). Does this hold for Asian Americans? W.L.’s father did 
not, in fact, vote. Consider Liu’s introductory quote, “it takes them [Asian Americans] a while to 
really assert themselves as being American.” Time may condition this transition process. 
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There is also the possibility that Asian Americans will come to see themselves as 
members of a distinct minority group within the U.S. Such a group identity, once activated, can 
serve as an information cue in campaigns and elections (Miller et al 1981; Dawson 1994; 
Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2006). The identification with “Asian-ness” or ethnicity implies the 
recognition of one’s own ancestry and commonality with other members in the group. With an 
established social and economic link, the individual is likely to infer personal interests from the 
group’s interests and needs (Dawson 1994). From the interviews conducted for the present study, 
increased Asian political representation is considered the most important issue the Asian 
American community faces. The underlying mechanism is that upon the acknowledgement of 
such need, those who are aware of both their American-ness as well as Asian-ness or ethnicity 
are more likely to claim not only their right as American citizens, but also their obligation as 
members of the (pan-)ethnic group. 
For example, W.L. considered himself politically active. He not only embraced his 
unique cultural heritage (he defined himself primarily as “Asian American”) but also consciously 
tried to break the stereotypes of Asian Americans, such as “foreigner” and “model minority.” 
When asked about the 2008 presidential election, W.L. admitted that he was more favorable 
towards Senator Obama because Obama was an African American. He also believed that 
Obama’s candidacy encouraged more minorities to participate in politics. W.L. explained, “It is 
more favorable with respect to again the racial ideas, ideologies that this country is profound in 
and continue to a certain extent to hold.” To W.L., being connected to a larger ethnic community 
motivated him to take his part in the governing process. 
Generally speaking, blended identities are products resulted from the acculturation 
process in which the confrontation, negotiation, and compromise of different cultural and social 
values occurs (Nagel 1994; Berry 2005). In adapting to the present political world, immigrants 
and their offspring (re)construct their identities and accordingly change their behavioral 
repertoire. The motivation for Asian Americans to do so is driven by the desire to be “in,” to be 
part of the mainstream (“American”), as well as the fact of being “different” (their Asian 
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appearances and cultural practices). In their case, the acquisition of American-ness and the 
awareness of Asian-ness or their own ethnicity take place simultaneously. Conceptually, 
individual Asians in the United States can belong to an Asian or ethnic community within 
American society and nation—these two components can co-exist compatibly with each other. 
Both in theory and practice, for new arrivals, group identity that embraces both their 
ancestral culture and their American-ness is likely to motivate the possessor to participate in 
politics. The American-ness reflects one’s (desired) integration into the society, so he exercises 
his political rights and civic duties. Connecting to one’s own Asian culture ties the individual to 
a broader (minority) community, a collective body; the sense of connectedness as well as her 
hybrid identity press on her the interest and need for the group. The absence of either element in 
her identity (i.e., “ethnic” only or “Asian” only, or even “American”) can weaken the motivation 
to participate politically. Therefore, it is important to observe that acculturation experiences can 
cultivate both a sense of American-ness and an identity as a member of a specific (pan)ethnic 
group.  
In summary, numerous studies tell us that the acculturation process of immigrants 
facilitates not only identity formulation, but also engaging other groups (Berry 2005) and 
participation in politics (Lien 1994) as characterized by Figure 4-1. The reasoning generates 
implication in the form of four working hypotheses for Asian American political participation. 
H1: The better acculturated Asian Americans are more likely to vote. Those who 
have been in the U.S. longer and those who are more comfortable using English 
have more opportunities to observe and interact with the political system, and 
thus more likely to be able to gather information about where, when, and how to 
vote.  
H2:Those who embrace both their American-ness and Asian-ness/ethnicity are 
more likely to vote. 
H3:  The better acculturated Asian Americans—those who reside in the U.S. for a 
longer period of time, and those who are more comfortable using English—are 




H4: Asian Americans who feel a sense of connectedness to the Asian American 
(or ethnic) community and those who experience racial and ethnic discrimination 
are more likely to be aware of their Asian-ness or their own ethnicity in their 
primary identities. 
 
DATA AND METHOD 
To examine the relationships between turnout and acculturation, group connectedness, 
and group identity, I use the 2000-2001 Pilot National Asian American Political Survey 
(PNAAPS) data (Lien, Conway, and Wong 2004). The units of analysis are individual Asian 
Americans. In addition to the PNAAPS, I refer to sixteen in-depth interviews with Asian voter, 
activists, and elite conducted for this project in Austin, Texas, as supplements to the multivariate 
analysis.60 The participants of the interviews were recruited through personal networks. While 
the interviews could not represent the Asian American community as a whole, the content was 
very informative for the next part of the project (Chapter five). 
Note that while Lien, Conway, and Wong (2004) explore multiple political orientations 
and the behavior of Asian Americans with the PNAAPS data in The Politics of Asian Americans, 
my focus here is to investigate the effects of acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and 
group identity on Asian American turnout. The PNAAPS relied on telephone interviews of 
respondents spread across five metropolitan areas: Chicago, Honolulu, Los Angeles, New York, 
and San Francisco (N=1,218). This reflects the fact that Asian Americans tend to cluster around 
metropolitan areas (Barnes and Bennett 2002, 7). “The average incidence rate for interviews 
drawn from the listed surname sample is 41%. The incidence rate for RDD (Random-Digit 
Dialing) interviews is 15%. The average refusal rate is 25%, with 34% in the listed sample and 
3.5% in the RDD sample.”61 The PNAAPS is the first large Asian American sample ever 
collected. The PNAAPS is also unique in that it included measures of acculturation experiences, 
perceptions about the group, racial identity, and political engagement. 
                                                
60 Ages of participants interviewed range from 20 to 55. 




The demography of the sample is broadly representative of the Asian American 
population nationally. The PNAAPS sample encompasses Chinese (27% of the sample, 
including Mainland, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), Philippine (18%), Japanese (15%), 
Korean (14%), Vietnamese (11%), Indian and Pakistan (10%), and other (5%) respondents. The 
average age is 44 years old (ranging from 18 to 100). Gender is evenly split. A majority of the 
sample (68%) has some college or higher education. The median income is $40K-$60K. With 
respect to political ideology, 40% of the sample describes their views as “liberal,” 25% says 
“conservative,” and 35% considers themselves in the middle. A majority of the sample (63%) 
identifies with the Democratic Party, 27% with the Republican Party, and 10% identify as 
independent. Overall, the PSAAPS sample is slightly older, more educated, and less wealthy 
than the national Asian population. Also, the PNAAPS sample has a larger proportion of Asian-
born individuals (75%)62 than the national Asian population (67% of Asian population in the 
U.S. was foreign-born).63 Still, these differences are relatively minor and ought not affect the 
current project. 
 
ACCULTURATION, GROUP CONNECTEDNESS, AND GROUP IDENTITY IN THE PNAAPS SAMPLE 
Given the definition of acculturation (one’s adaptation to the present environment after 
the migration), I use two measures to estimate the acculturation level, including how long one 
had resided in the current town or city,64 and to what degree one uses English at home (mainly 
English, some English, no English). The length of current residency is important because it 
                                                
62 In order to distinguish of which generation the participants were, Lien, Conway and Wong asked participants 
“Were either of your parents born in Asia?” 
63 Elizabeth M. Grieco, 2010, “Race and Hispanic Origin of the Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 
2007,” Census Bureau Report. http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/acs-11.pdf (last access: June 18 2011) 
64 I acknowledge the measure is somewhat conservative since some respondents’ previous homes might already be 
in the U.S. In the NPAAPS, although Lien asked respondents “how many years have you lived in the United States 
on a permanent basis?” those who were born in America were not asked this question. If I were to substitute the 
missing values for the U.S.-born in this question with their age, the results of the “Asian American” identity and 
turnout models remain the same. As a result, I choose the current measure. Furthermore, the conservative measure in 
fact underestimates the effect of time spent in the U.S. on group identity and turnout. In other words, the results give 
me confidence in the influence of time on group identity and turnout among Asian Americans. 
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indicates not only how long one has been exposed to the local culture and community, but also 
the degree of residential mobility. Those who have been in the same locale for a longer period of 
time are more likely to develop a new identity, build up new social ties, and more likely to 
participate in politics (Highton 2000). Though time is not sufficient for full acculturation, it is a 
necessary component for successful integration. Participants of the PNAAPS, on average, have 
spent more than a decade in the current city or town of their residency (13 years, ranging from 
one to 79 years). Among different nationalities, the average stay ranges from 28 years (Japanese) 
to 8 years (Indians/Pakistanis). 
Home language is also critical to measuring acculturation. When at home with family, 
individuals are no longer forced to speak the “official” language in order to conduct business or 
communicate to peers, but can freely choose the language that they are most comfortable 
speaking. Therefore, the language used at home indicates how well one is (or trying to be) 
adapted to the environment and to what degree one has overcome the language barrier to 
integrate into the mainstream. Those who feel more comfortable speaking English at home are 
more likely to incorporate their “American-ness” in their identities and more likely to vote. One 
quarter of the PNAAPS sample usually spoke English at home; another quarter of the sample 
used some English but mixed with other languages, while half of the sample usually used 
languages other than English at home. The differences in home language significantly vary by 
nationalities ( =610.07, p < .001). The Japanese used English at home more often than other 
groups (79% of the Japanese used mainly English at home), followed by Filipinos (43%) and 
Indians/Pakistanis (21%). Conversely, more than seventy percent of the Chinese (79%), Koreans 
(70%), and Vietnamese (78%) used a non-English language at home. Again, the observed pattern 
here could reflect the higher proportion of U.S.-born Japanese and English as one of official 
languages in the Philippines, India, and Pakistan.  
The second concept of interest, group connectedness, is determined by three factors. As 
described earlier, group identity functions on one’s perceived connection to the group (Dawson 
1994) as well as its members (Kaufmann 2003). Those with a sense of shared fate and culture 
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with other Asians or their own ethnic group are more likely to adopt the (pan-)ethnic identity and 
more likely to vote. To measure group connectedness, participants were asked whether they 
thought (1) “what happens generally to other groups of Asians in this country will affect what 
happens in your life?” (yes or no), (2) “what happens generally to other groups of [respondent’s 
ethnic group] in this country will affect what happens in your life?” (yes or no) , (3) and to what 
degree one thought that groups of Asians in America are culturally homogenous (very similar, 
somewhat similar, somewhat different, or very different). Approximately half of the sample 
perceived a sense of shared fate with other Asians and their own ethnic group, as well as a 
certain degree of cultural commonality among Asian Americans. More specifically, fifty four 
percent of the sample thought what happened to other Asians in the U.S. would affect their own 
lives. Sixty percent of the sample thought what happened to other members of the same ethnic 
group would affect their personal lives. A majority of the sample (52%) considered Asian 
cultures similar (9% “very similar” and 43% “somewhat similar”). 
The last factor used to measure group connectedness is racial and ethnic discrimination 
experiences. Respondents were asked whether they experienced discrimination in the U.S. due to 
his ethnic background (yes or no). Existing studies show that experiencing discrimination can 
make one aware of his racial and ethnic background (and thus connecting himself to the group) 
and can facilitate the development of a panethnic identity (Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Masuoka 
and Rim 2007). As a result, those who experience discrimination are more likely to take 
actions—to vote. Among the PNAAPS sample, more than one third (34%) reported some form 
of ethnic discrimination. Koreans reported the highest level of racial and ethnic discrimination 
(42%), while only 11% of Vietnamese said they experienced some form of discrimination due to 
their racial and ethnic background ( =38.61, p < .001). 
Group identity, as described earlier, is a psychological identification with (and 
attachment to) a larger community. It encompasses an individual’s connection to the group. 
Operationally, it is measured by asking whether someone thinks of himself as an American, 
Asian American, Asian, ethnic American (e.g., Japanese American), or in ethnic terms only (e.g., 
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Korean). Figure 4-2 presents the distribution of group identity by ethnic communities. Sixteen 
percent of the sample considered themselves to be “Asian American” (ranging from 13% to 23% 
across ethnicities), and 12% described themselves as “American.” More than one third of the 
sample (36%) considered themselves as “ethnic American,” and another one third (31%) 
identified in “ethnic” terms only. This implies that most (36%+31%) Asians in America do not 
identify beyond ethnic divisions. Twenty percent of Indians, Pakistanis, and Filipinos in the 
sample thought themselves as “Asian American,” and at least one third within each ethnic group 
considered themselves “ethnic American.” Greater percentages of Japanese, Filipinos, Indians, 
and Pakistanis saw themselves as “American,” while 40% of Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese 
identified in ethnic terms only. 
Nativity and language help explain this pattern. The Japanese have a relatively longer 
history in the U.S., and many Japanese are Nisei (second generation), Sansei (third generation), 
or even beyond. As acculturation theory predicts, the longer one resides in a society, the more 
likely the individual is to learn and adopt the local values, norms, and practices. Consequently, a 
Japanese American may think of himself as “American” before recognizing his Japanese 
ancestry. Two reasons could contribute to the slightly larger number of Filipinos and 
Indians/Pakistanis in the PNAAPS sample identifying as “American.” First, more Filipinos (34% 
of the sample) and Indians/Pakistanis (12%) were born in the U.S. than other ethnic groups 
(except for the Japanese, of which 79% were born in the U.S.) ( =412.07, p < .001). Second, 
Filipinos and Indians/Pakistanis were more conversant in English compared to other ethnic 
groups because English is one of the official languages in Philippines, India, and Pakistan. 
Consequently, the language barrier is less of a hurdle for acculturation into American society for 
these groups and they are more likely to identify as “American.” 
[Figure 4-2 Distribution of Group Identity by Ethnicity] 
Although some Asian Americans viewed themselves primarily as “Asian” or “ethnic” 
only, the following analysis focuses on the (pan-)ethnic “Asian American” and “ethnic 
American” identities for two reasons. First and most importantly, the two components of pan-
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ethnicity (“Asian-ness”/ethnicity and “American-ness”) are important for Asian Americans to act 
as a bloc in the political arena. As mentioned earlier, lacking either element of the (pan-)ethnic 
identity can weaken the appeal for political participation.65 Therefore, in addition to the effect of 
group identity on Asian turnout, this analysis also focuses on investigating the causes and 
consequences of these identities. Second, although Asian cultures are heterogeneous in some 
ways, they share some common bonds; beyond having similar appearances and diets, they tend 
to value tradition and have relatively hierarchical family structures.66  
To distinguish effects of specific group identities on turnout, the turnout model includes 
three dummy variables coded 1 as those who primarily identified with the term, and 0 otherwise: 
“American,” “Asian American,” and “ethnic American.” The reference group are those of 
“Asian” or “ethnic” only identities.  
Beyond measuring acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity, the analysis 
includes basic demographics to control for effects not accruing to the core variables. These 
demographics are nativity, ethnicity, age, education (with or without any college experiences), 
family income (below or beyond $60K), and gender. Nativity is measured by whether one was 
born in an Asian country or not. To capture the effect of specific ethnic groups (whether there are 
baseline differences in panethnic identification for particular group, compared with everyone else 
in the sample) and keep the model as parsimonious as possible, I create three dummy variables 
for the groups that are more than 15% of the sample: Chinese (28%), Japanese (19%), and 
Filipinos (16%). In addition, conventionally important political attitudes are also taken into 
consideration: political interest, strength of partisanship, and religious attendance.67 
 
                                                
65 If one only sees himself as American, he can be more active because he grasps his sense of belonging in the 
nation, or he can be less active because he does not feel the significance of his vote. If one only considers himself 
Asian, he is likely to observe American politics as an outsider and does not participate. 
66 Founder of “Drink Club,” Kelvin Yip, a 23-year-old market analyst who lives in San Francisco, described the 
mingling with other Asians, "What's happening here is people are talking to other Asian ethnicities, and we're seeing 
we have similar upbringings, and we see Asian cultures do share many similarities." (“Asians Pursue a United 
State,” Ryan Kim, The San Francisco Chronicle, 2001, August 2) 
67 For literature on relationships between political participation and political interest as well as church attendance, 
see Brady, Verba, and Schlozman’s “Beyond SES: A Resource Model of Political Participation”(1995). 
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ANALYZING ASIAN AMERICAN TURNOUT IN THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
Table 4-1 offers models of turnout in the 2000 presidential election using a binary logit 
estimator. Coefficients are estimated of explanatory variables’ effects on participation in the 
2000 presidential election. Acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and group identity 
have positive impacts on Asian turnout, though we should interpret the results with caution.68 
The more stable is one’s residence, the more likely he would vote, all else being equal. English-
usage at home, however, did not influence whether one voted or not. This is also applicable to 
other groups in terms of residential stability. Furthermore, given the high percentage of foreign-
born Asians in the U.S., many of them are new arrivals and integration takes time. The longer 
Asians settle in one place, the more familiar they are with the American electoral system and 
local environments, the more stable are their local networks, the more likely they will vote.69  
A sense of shared culture also increases turnout, while a sense of shared fate with other 
Asians or racial/ethnic discrimination experiences do not. It is possible that those who perceive 
commonality among Asian cultures are more likely to consider themselves as part of the 
minority community. As a result, the perception of shared culture improves the probability one 
would vote.70 
Regarding the influence of group identity on Asian turnout, those who identified as 
“Asian American” or “ethnic American” were more likely to vote than those who identified as 
“Asian” or “ethnic” only. Recall that we presume (pan-)ethnic identity is driven by both affinity 
for a broader ethnic community and the nation. It is possible that those who embrace an 
“Asian/ethnic American” identity are prone to espouse the “American” values of political rights 
                                                
68 In examining the effects of acculturation, group connectedness, and group identity on turnout, I choose binary 
logit model for two reasons. First, though some factors are to certain extent correlated, the variance-covariance 
matrix of the full model in Table 4-1 shows no serious evidence of multi-collinearity. Second, while utilizing two-
stage estimators may be theoretically appropriate based on Firgure 4-1, the interpretation of a binary logit model is 
more straightforward and intuitively understandable. Therefore, binary logit modeling is a reasonable choice in 
analyzing factors of interest. 
69 I test whether length of current residency or English usage interacts with “Asian American” identity influencing 
turnout but find no support. The results of including interaction terms do not alter findings from the turnout model. 
To keep the model as parsimonious as possible, I exclude the interaction terms from the chapter. 
70 This may be even more prominent when a threat to the group is present. This condition, however, is untested due 
to available and yet limited data. 
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and freedom (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Barreto and Munoz 2003) while acknowledging 
their Asian-ness or ethnicity. Those who primarily identified as “American,” however, are no 
more likely to vote than those identified with “Asian” or “ethnic” only. 
Among the control variables used to explain turnout in 2000, significant effects are 
associated with nativity, age, and not surprisingly, political interest, strength of partisanship, and 
religious attendance. Those who were born in Asian countries were significantly less likely to 
vote than their U.S.-born counterpart. Nativity possibly captures the remaining of acculturation 
impact for the Asian-born; those who experienced the dramatic changes of migrating to a 
different environment and only recently learned about the new society and political system are 
less likely to vote. To the Asian-born, the cost of voting is relatively higher than the U.S.-born 
who grew up in America and do not need to make much effort to vote.  
Predictably, those who are more interested in politics in general, who are strong partisans, 
and who attend religious service more frequently are more likely to vote, all else being equal.71 
The significance of religious attendance implies the importance of civic skills and/or local 
networks. It is also important to point out that while the CPS data show supportive evidence for 
the effect of education on turnout at the individual level, the relationship is missing in the 
PNAAPS data. 
[Table 4-1 Results of Turnout Models] 
Of course, gauging real-world effects from logit coefficients is difficult. Fortunately, logit 
coefficients can be transformed into probabilities enabling more straightforward interpretation. 
Unlike regular regression coefficients, the predicted dependent variable changes nonlinearly as 
the values of the other independent variables change. To measure the maximum effect of the 
significant variables, we hold all other variables at their means (for continuous variables) or 
mode (for category variables) and change only the variable of interest from its minimum value to 
                                                
71 These findings hold even after controlling for political interest and/or involvement in politics of homelands. 
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its maximum.72 For Asians who just immigrated to the U.S., the estimated probability of voting 
was 32%, all else being equal. After living in the U.S. for a decade, the estimated probability of 
voting for Asian Americans increased 13 percentage points; after another ten years, their 
probability of voting increased another 14 percentage points; and after another decade, their 
probability of voting increased another 12 percentage points. The marginal increase by the length 
of residency is thus not only statistically but also substantively significant. Those who lived in 
the current city/town for 79 years are almost certain to vote (predicted probability of voting is 
97%). 
Among group connectedness factors, the estimated probability of voting for those who 
feel a great deal of cultural commonality among Asians was 25 percentage points higher than the 
probability of voting for those who thought Asian cultures were very different. Obviously, the 
perceived homogeneity among Asian cultures improved Asian turnout significantly. By contrast, 
neither a sense of shared fate nor experience of racial/ethnic discrimination has significant or 
substantive impact on the likelihood of voting.  
Those whose identities embrace not only their American-ness, but also their Asian-ness 
or ethnicity are more likely to vote than those who only identified with their Asian or ethnic 
communities.  Specifically, those who identified as “Asian American” 55% were 20 percentage 
points more likely to vote in the 2000 presidential election that those who identified as 
“Asian/ethnic only.” Similarly, those identified as “ethnic American” are more likely to vote 
than those identified as “Asian” or “ethnic” only (48% and 35%, respectively). Though 
                                                
72 Specifically, the average length of residency in the current city/town is 13.04 years, the average shared 
commonality among Asian cultures is 2.46 (on a scale ranged from 1 “very different” to 4 “very similar” among 
Asian cultures), the average age in the sample is 43.28 years old, the average general political interest is 2.86 (on a 
scale ranged from 1 “not at all interested” to 4 “very interested”), and average frequency for church attendance is 
2.12 (on a scale ranged from 0 “never” to 4 “every week”) meaning at least once or twice a month attending 
religious services. Among categorical variables, the plurality chose to use language other than English at home, 
identified as “ethnic American,” sensed certain degree of shared fate with other Asians in this country, did not 
experience racial or ethnic discrimination, were born in Asian countries, were Chinese, had some college 




“American” identifiers are substantively more likely to vote (50%) than “Asian/ethnic only” 
identifiers, the difference is not statistically significant. 
Nativity, age, political interest, partisan strength, and religious service attendance also 
influence Asian turnout. The estimated probability of voting for the Asian-born is 25 percentage 
points less than that for the U.S.-born. The predicted probability of those who just entered the 
“voting-age-eligible electorate” was 29%. For every ten years span, the estimated probability of 
voting increased approximately 8 percentage points (predicted probability of voting for a 28 
year-old is 36%, for a 38 is 44%, and for a 68 year-old is 67%). The likelihood of voting among 
those who had at least some college education (+10 percentage points) and those whose family 
income were beyond $60K (+7 percentage points) are higher than their counterparts, though the 
difference is not statistically significant. Not surprisingly, those who were very interested in 
politics (+25 percentage points compared to who were not at all interested in politics), strong 
partisans (+13 percentage points compared to non-strong partisans), and those who attended 
religious service weekly (+27 percentage points compared to those who did not attend religious 
service at all) had a higher turnout than their counterparts.  
The findings support the hypotheses concerning the effects of acculturation, group 
connectedness, and group identity on Asian turnout. In particular, the data show that lower levels 
of acculturation and group connectedness contribute to Asian Americans’ low turnout. As 
suggested earlier, the low turnout among Asian Americans can be attributed to the absence of 
either American-ness or Asian-ness/ethnicity in one’s identity. Acculturation is a very time-
consuming process. Judy Chu’s reflection upon her 2009 victory in the 32nd District of 
California captures the essence of time in the acculturation process, “Now, two generations 
later," she observes, "here I am, his granddaughter, a member of Congress.”73 Not only years, but 
also generations are what it takes for an immigrant to grasp political power “from nothing.” 
                                                
73 “Cutting Her Own Path,” Kris Kitto, The Hill, 2009, September 10, 2009. Judy Chu is the first elected Chinese 
American female to Congress (“Judy Chu Trounces Rivals in Congressional Race,” Jean Merl, Los Angeles Times, 
2009, July 14). 
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Though being aware of one’s own ethnic background and simultaneously embracing 
one’s new nationality can improve turnout among Asians in the U.S., cultivating a new identity 
undoubtedly takes time. The meaning and the formation of this identity, however, are unclear. 
For instance, who are likely to see themselves as “Asian American” or “ethnic American?” Does 
perceived cultural commonality influence one’s self-identification? Do various levels of group 
connectedness affect group identity formation?  
Less than half of the PNAAPS sample perceived significant commonality among Asian 
cultures (17% “very similar” and 30% “somewhat similar”). This is not to say this lack of 
perceived commonality is somehow “wrong.” Although Asians are bound together by similar 
physical appearances (black hair and yellow skin), typical upbringing (achievement-oriented) 
and family structure (hierarchical), Asians are diverse with respect to language, country of 
origin, and customs. Therefore, different ethnic groups may not see each other as allies. Hoon 
Lee, a 26-year-old San Francisco consultant, though excited and proud when he sees Asian 
Americans on the ballot, also remembers occasions in which he felt a gap between Chinese and 
Korean.74 Lacking a broad and sturdy common ground among Asian groups may present a 
barrier to forging a strong panethnic coalition. I next investigate how acculturation experiences 
and group connectedness affect group identity while controlling for important demographics. 
 
ANALYZING GROUP IDENTITY AMONG ASIAN AMERICANS 
 
Table 4-2 presents models of panethnic identity as a function of acculturation and group 
connectedness. More particularly, a multinomial logit estimator is used to generate coefficients 
representing the independent effects of a wide range of explanation and control variables. The 
outcome categories include “American,” “Asian American,” “ethnic American,” and 
“Asian/ethnic only” with the last group serving as the reference. Note that a sense of shared fate 
                                                
74 “Asians Pursue a United State,” Ryan Kim, The San Francisco Chronicle, 2001, August 2. 
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with members of one’s ethnic group is included in the group identity model, while political 
attitudes and religious attendance is excluded. The interest here is to understand the formation 
and causes of group identity, and thus it is reasonable to control for one’s perceived shared fate 
with other members in the same ethnic group. On the other hand, political interest, partisan 
strength and religious attendance, though are positively related to political participation, are not 
theoretically associated with group identity. For the sake of simplicity, these political attitudes 
and religious attendance are excluded from the group identity model. 
Most important for present purposes, acculturation experiences and group connectedness 
matter in cultivating a hybrid (pan-)ethnic identity. Among different aspects of acculturation, 
both language (English usage) and residential stability are important factors. Those who felt 
more comfortable using English at home were more likely to embrace an identity acknowledging 
their American-ness, all else being equal. This, of course, was predicted: language used at home 
shows the user’s preference and reflects the subtle but powerful influence of language in the 
Asian American integration process.  
Length of residency in the current city/town also helps to explain a hybrid identity 
(“Asian/ethnic American”). However, it is reasonable to postulate that although time in this 
country approximates one’s exposure to American culture and society, it only reflects 
opportunities; it does not guarantee that someone will voluntarily choose to submerge himself in 
his surroundings. Indeed, the residential concentration of Asian Americans (Teranishi 2004) can 
to some degree prevent residents from interacting with the mainstream.75 Still, though time is 
insufficient to foster a hybrid identity, it is necessary. 
Among group connectedness factors, experiences of racial/ethnic discrimination most 
effectively suppress the likelihood of identifying as “American,” “Asian American,” or “ethnic 
American.” As reactive ethnicity theory predicts (Portes and Rumbaut 1996), such experiences 
                                                
75 Molly, a personal friend and a member of the Austin Chinese Church, shared her upbringing in a church dinner 
event (“Mulan’s Dilemma”) on April 16, 2011. As a second generation Chinese daughter, Molly resented her 




further highlight the racial or ethnic uniqueness of the individual and make her aware of her 
difference from the majority of the society. In addition, a sense of shared cultural commonality 
elevates the likelihood of embracing the “Asian American” identity, compared to the chance of 
identifying as “Asian/ethnic” only. This implies that a sense of common culture is perhaps the 
surest path to establishing a vibrant, engaged Asian American voting bloc. In contrast, shared 
fate (with other Asians or the ethnic community) perceptions do not appear to foster a broader 
sense of (pan-)ethnic identity. The absence of sensing a shared fate among Asians (or within the 
ethnic community) can be attributed to their different historical paths and geographical 
distributions. Asian groups, unlike African Americans who share the memory of slavery, do not 
have a history of collective social or political deprivation. Therefore, to Asian Americans, the 
bond between individuals and the (pan-)ethnic group as a whole may be weak. 
Among the control variables, nativity (U.S.-born status) and gender have influence on 
group identity. As predicted, those who were born in Asian countries are less likely to embrace 
see themselves as “American” or “Asian American” than as “Asian/ethnic only.” Perhaps the 
status of being native-born and the Asian born mean more than nativity? Is there particular 
pattern of demographics by nativity? For instance, nine out of ten Chinese, Korean, or 
Vietnamese were born in Asian countries, eight out of ten Indian/Pakistanis, and six out of ten 
Filipino were also Asian-born. The only exception is Japanese (eight out of ten were born in the 
U.S.) This implies the significance of each group’s entrance and development in the United 
States. In addition, compared to the Asian-born, the U.S.-born Asian Americans tend to have a 
higher level of residential stability, a higher level of education and family income, to see 
themselves as “(ethnic) American,” slightly more likely to perceive a higher degree of cultural 
commonality among Asians, more likely to experience racial/ethnic discrimination, and less 
likely to attend religious service.76 
                                                
76 These differences achieve statistical significance at the 0.05 level. 
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These patterns certainly suggest substantive and systemic differences between the U.S.-
born and Asian-born Asian American populations. Yet, the underlying mechanism is not 
detected in the PNAAPS questionnaire and thus unable to be tested. In addition, Asian women, 
compared to men, are less likely to adopt identities that acknowledging their American-ness than 
their Asian-ness or ethnicity. 
[Table 4-2 Estimating Asian American Group Identity] 
In summary, the results offer tentative support for the hypothesis of the effect of 
acculturation and group connectedness on group identity. Those who are more comfortable using 
English are likely to embrace their American-ness. Those who have a higher degree of 
residential stability are more likely to choose a hybrid identity (i.e., “Asian/ethnic American”). 
Those experienced racial/ethnic discrimination are likely to withdraw from the identity that 
acknowledges their American-ness. Those who perceive a sense of shared culture among Asian 
groups are more likely to embrace the “Asian American” identity, all else being equal.  
The significance of language in the integration process implies great technical difficulties 
for parties and candidates attempting to mobilize Asian Americans due to diverse languages used 
by various Asian groups. Perhaps most importantly, in order to create a coalition beyond ethnic 
divide, political parties and candidates have to cultivate Asians’ perception of shared culture. As 
scholars predict, a minority coalition can only exist when a solid common ground is well 
established (Kaufmann 2003; Sanchez 2008). 
Furthermore, it is important to understand the meaning of group identity in order to 
delineate its impact on political participation. If individual Asians passively accept the imposed 
label of “Asian American,” the identity per se may not be as politically meaningful as if it is 
adopted actively and voluntarily. Such a possibility is illustrated by T.T.’s elaboration on her 
preference of “Chinese American” to “Asian American:” 
Overall, I really like it (i.e., her Chinese American identity). I felt like it was a 
great opportunity for me to understand myself better, and my heritage. Like I said, 
with so many friends, we had so many things in common, it was almost uncanny. 
“Well, your parents did that too?” So it was very comforting in a lot of ways to 
 
70 
find someone else who had been in that same setting. … I think that’s (i.e., “Asian 
American”) a label that non-Asians use. And so it becomes commonly accepted 
and used in survey and things you fill out that you are Asian Pacific Islanders 
group. But I don’t really think that many of us thought of us Asian Americans 
first. 
 
Another example is “American” A.Y. He enjoys sharing his cultural heritage (such as 
traditions, festivals, food, and being proud of his skill of using chopsticks), but his cultural 
identity does not bridge to his political orientations. If “Asian American” indicates only a vague 
and intangible label, the identity tells us little about its possessor. If there is no solid common 
ground for people with Asian descent to recognize and embrace, “Asian American” may become 
a popular but plain dish without unique flavor for Asians. Perhaps T.T.’s observation was 
sufficient to explain Asian Americans’ lack of participation at the polls: 
“Unfortunately, I would think another dominant character was that we weren’t 
that much involved in other activities on campus. Most of us did three things: we 
studied, we hung out with other Chinese Americans, and most of us were pretty 
involved in either campus (religious) fellowship … or something like that. … We 
weren’t politically active; we weren’t even that active on campus fraternity or 
sorority or campus leadership, a few people did musical things, played in an 
orchestra. We all played in orchestra in high school, every person played violin 
or something, but by college, we weren’t that committed, but still handful were 
still involved. But other than that, I would say that we weren’t that involved in 
other activities.”77 
 
Without a commonly perceived collective body, each ethnic group forms only a small 
segment within the entire American population. Its political influence is inherently much more 
limited. Although Asians in the U.S. have made strides numerically, their sense of a panethnic 
community and of larger identity remains elusive. Recently, a growing number of Asian 
American political elites claim to see clear signs that Asians as a group are slowly beginning to 
                                                
77  T.T.’s quote also suggests the significance of socialization factors on the U.S.-born Asian Americans. Even 
though the U.S.-born grow up in the U.S., the political cues they receive (consciously or unconsciously) that are 
supplied by their parents may differ from those supplied in, for example, White households. The lack of political 




coalesce (Lai 2011; Wildermuth 2011). In contrast, however, the data at hand show many Asian 
immigrants and their offspring remain rooted in ethnic identities (35% of the PNAAPS sample 
identified as “ethnic American” and 31% as “ethnic only.”) The challenges to drawing Asians 
from different groups together range from language and religion to historical rivalries in the U.S. 
and in Asia.78 Nevertheless, the findings also shine the light on the future political path for Asian 
Americans. As Asian Americans gradually grow in number, the number of associations or 
gatherings affiliated with Asians should increase, along with an attendant sense of commonality 
and identity. The most hopeful means for Asian American to achieve participatory and 
representational equality are to improve the awareness of their potential political influence and to 
band together to make their voice heard. 
 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter seeks to explain Asian American turnout by focusing on acculturation, 
group connectedness, and group identity. The main research hypotheses are that the more 
acculturated and those who feel more connected to the larger Asian community are more likely 
to show up at polls. The empirical analysis of the PNAAPS data presented in the pages suggest 
that a higher degree of residential stability, a sense of shared culture, identified as “Asian/ethnic 
American,” the older, strong partisans and those who are interested in politics, and religious 
attendants are more likely to vote. On the other hand, the Asian-born are less likely to get out the 
vote. Given that the majority of Asians is foreign-born, low turnout among Asians in the U.S. 
comes as no surprise. This finding also helps explain lower turnout among Asian Americans 
despite their higher level of educational attainment at the group level. 
In addition, both acculturation and group connectedness influence group identity choice. 
The use of English at home, residential stability, and a sense of shared Asian culture, are critical 
to fostering “Asian American” identity, while racial/ethnic discrimination experience hinder the 
                                                
78 “Asians Pursue a United State,” Ryan Kim, The San Francisco Chronicle, 2001, August 2. 
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embracement of an identity that acknowledge one’s American-ness. As observed, the foreign-
born are less likely to see themselves as “American” or “Asian American.” Comparisons of 
demographics between the U.S.-born and Asian-born highlight a few differences: the former has 
higher levels of socioeconomic status, is more residentially stable, tends to identify as “(ethnic) 
American,” tend to be aware of their racial/ethnic discrimination experiences, and attend 
religious service less. These systemic differences between the two subgroups suggest underlying 
mechanism behind the status of being U.S.- or Asian-born. 
Why does the baseline model fail to explain Asian American turnout rates at the group 
level? Because the majority of Asians in the U.S. that migrated from foreign lands are subject to 
the acculturation process. During this process, language, familiarity with the local political 
system, and residential stability present potential barriers to the formation of a new identity as 
well as the realization of their political power. Put another way, due to the prominence of 
foreign-born Asians in the U.S., acculturation and group connectedness factors may trump 
socioeconomic status in explaining the relatively low turnout among Asian Americans at the 
individual level.  
In addition, the prevalence of educational achievement among Asian Americans may 
undermine the explanatory power of socioeconomic resources on political participation. Given 
the emphasis on educational and financial success in Asian cultures, and the limited social 
mobility in other avenues in American society, Asians are motivated to socially move upward 
via educational channel (Sue and Okazaki 1990).  
Note that evidence presented here does not indicate that these factors only affect Asian 
American participation, but not other racial and ethnic groups. According to the literature, 
residential stability, discrimination experiences, and nativity obviously also influence White, 
African American, and Hispanic participation. My contribution is that these effects also are 
influential on Asian American political incorporation. Without available data comprised of 
substantial numbers of respondents from each racial and ethnic group, which engenders 
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meaningful comparisons by groups, the question of to what extent these factors yield various 
effects for each group awaits future research work. 
Caveats aside, there is no doubt that how Asians view themselves matters to their 
political life. Little evidence yet supports the connection between individual and group interests 
and economic status among Asians in the U.S. Thus, a major question is whether or not the 
socioeconomic wellness prevents Asian Americans from coming together and perceiving a sense 
of linked fate between individuals and the broader community. Does it need to be conceptualized 
and measured differently for this group or subgroups, or is it simply irrelevant? For instance, 
how do experiences of Vietnamese fishermen in Louisiana after the 1975 immigration wave 
connect to those of Chinese railroad workers in California in the 1800’s? Is it “good” or “bad” to 
have such connection? What is the political significance of such connection, if any? 
In the hallowed “Declaration of Independence,” Jefferson wrote, “We hold these truths to 
be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with 
certain unalienable Rights … That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among 
Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed...” Clearly, to realize this 
“democratic” promise and to attain political equity, Asian Americans must rely on something 
besides socioeconomic resources. Developing a sense of group identity appears to be the most 
possible pathway to enhanced participation. 
This possibility is evident not only in the quantitative data, but throughout in-depth 
interviews with Asian American citizens and elites. As W.L. puts it:  
Asian Americans in the government needs to be addressed; having mentorship 
program, having ways … joining political campaigns, getting Asian American 
students interested in the political system so that we can influence the way our 
country works, so that we can help hopefully our own community but also learn 
the broader issues that affect our community and the United States as a whole, 
being able to see Asian Americans in the spotlight. 
 
Looking at the bigger picture, T.C. said:  
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I think the most important issue is power. … to create a United States in which 
people from any group can attain power, not because of where they’re from or 
their race but because of the integrity of who they are. 
 
At the participatory end of the equation, enhanced representation requires the 
development of attitudes and identities that foster activities such as voting, contributing money, 
attending meetings, and otherwise becoming engaged. The present data are consistent with the 
work of Dahl (1961) and others who highlight the role of social (a.k.a. “ethnic”) identities in this 
developmental process. But another possibility is that political elites, and especially co-ethnic 
elites, can also facilitate this process. It is this possibility that animates the work of chapter five.
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CHAPTER FIVE: The Effect Of Racial And Ethnic Cues On Asian American 
Turnout 
 
As outlined earlier, previous studies of the political participation of recent immigrant 
groups have emphasized the importance of socioeconomic status (SES) (Barreto and Munoz 
2003), political socialization (Cho 1999; Barreto and Munoz 2003), political mobilization 
(Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Bloemraad 2006; Wong 2006) and group affinities (Lien et 
al. 2004; Lee 2008). Yet, Asian American political participation cannot be readily explained by 
these theories. Given the paradox of Asian American participation (or lack thereof) in light of 
their SES, in this chapter I examine the effect of racial and ethnic cues on Asian American 
turnout. Specifically, I investigate to what extent that descriptive representation theory holds for 
Asians? 
Unsurprisingly, some Asian American voters interviewed for this study expressed an 
interest in seeing more Asian American representation in public arenas.79 With low turnout rates, 
however, Asian Americans have little chance of getting immediate attention from political 
parties and candidates. Therefore, the real long-term question is: What political strategies might 
mobilize the Asian American community? More broadly, what extant conditions can motivate 
Asian Americans to go to the polls?  
This chapter relies on an original survey-based experiment to answer the aforementioned 
questions. Of special interest is how Asian American candidates might affect Asian American 
voters. The existing literature finds that voters tend to vote for candidates who share similar 
sociological traits or backgrounds with the voters themselves. Scholars in racial and ethnic 
politics, for example, suggest that members of racial minorities tend to elect candidates who are 
like themselves (Welch and Hibbing 1984; Hero and Tolbert 1995; Adler 2001; Gay 2001). 
Similar results, though somewhat uneven, are found in studies of gender and politics (Paolino 
                                                
79 Ages of participants interviewed range from 20 to 55. 
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1995; Gay and Tate 1998). The question of whether racial and ethnic cues effectively operate 
among Asian Americans at the individual level, however, is somewhat unanswered. This chapter, 
therefore, aims to provide data and analysis targeting this gap in the research. 
The underlying motivation of this study is both theoretical and practical. Theoretically, 
the means by which immigrant populations participate in American politics has been a central 
question for our discipline going back to the work of Dahl (1961) and, arguably, Tocqueville. 
Essentially, what intrigued political scientists is the process through which newcomers are 
integrated into their new political world. Practically, systemic legitimacy and perhaps party 
advantage depend on mobilizing these under-mobilized votes. The party politics literature points 
out that party system change in the U.S. depends largely on mobilization, rather than conversion 
(Carmines and Stimson 1981; Wanat and Burke 1982). Therefore, the basis upon which Asian 
American voters enter the political system will substantially define the next generation’s party 
system. If party elites or operatives are looking for new political territory, their eyes should 
immediately go to Hispanics and Asians. And if Hispanics and Asians come to participate at 
rates commensurate with their growing presence in the population, the U.S. parties could look 
very different. 
My structure here proceeds as follows: I first briefly review the concepts of political 
representation, and next outline the design of the experiment and working hypotheses. I then 
present, analyze, and discuss the results before considering the implications of the analysis for 
both future studies and practical politics. 
 
POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 
Generally speaking, there are two types of political representation: descriptive and 
substantive representation. In this study, I define descriptive representation as the representation 
of Asian American voters by candidates (or officials) with Asian ancestry. Substantive 
representation refers to the representation of the Asian community’s interests and needs in the 
 
77 
decision-making process, regardless of the representative’s racial or ethnic background. The 
former (which is the focus of this chapter) has a symbolic nature, while the latter is defined by 
policy references that favor the community. In addition, I posit that the possibility of descriptive 
representation—that is, the presence of an Asian American candidate on the ballot—serves as a 
mobilizing agent for Asian American voters. This chapter thus aims to measure the causal 
relationship between conceptions of political representation among Asian Americans and turnout 
at the individual level.  
Descriptive representation theory predicts the group prefers to elect representatives who 
share their race, ethnicity, and other background characteristics. Note that the conceptualization 
of descriptive representation here is slightly different from that of “political empowerment.” 
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) define political empowerment as “the extent to which a group has 
achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making” (378) (emphasis 
added). Political empowerment refers to the impact of elected officials on voters’ political 
orientations and/or behavior. The experiment analyzed below tests the explanatory power of 
descriptive representation theory for Asian turnout intent, but does not measure or test political 
empowerment. 
The basic psychological mechanism posits that the racial and ethnic cues will help voters 
to make their decisions. Voters will use the cues to infer things about the candidate. If a voter 
does not know much about the election, when she sees one of the contestants is Asian, she will 
feel that the candidate probably is similar to herself, or infer that the candidate values what she 
values and shares her interests and needs as well as policy stands. With a hint of likely policy 
responsiveness, the desire for descriptive representation encourages voters to get involved with 
an election in which a coethnic (or panethnic) candidate is running for the office. Although 
descriptive representation may also drive vote choice, my focus here tests whether the 
appearance of a coethnic candidate on the ballot elevates Asian American voters’ turnout. The 
theoretical perspective leads to the following working hypothesis: 
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H1: Asian American voters turnout at higher rates when an Asian American candidate 
contests the office, especially when (a) the Asian American candidate is coethnic, and/or (b) the 
Asian American candidate’s ethnic tie is long standing or generational. 
 
Note the presumption that, if the voters are less informed or engaged in politics, then 
racial and ethnic cues are more useful. This is especially true when cues explicitly tie the 
candidate to the voter’s own ethnic group (i.e., coethnic candidates), and/or when the ethnic bond 
inferred from the cue is long standing—making the candidate’s connection with the voter’s own 
ethnic group more promising and credible. In other words, these information shortcuts probably 
do not operate universally among all individuals. After all, people only react to political events to 
the extent that they are aware of political affairs (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992). More to the point, 
there are many studies demonstrating that most voters do not have a consistent and sophisticated 
political ideology, and therefore rely on shortcuts when asked to register an opinion about 
politics (Popkin 1994, Lupia 1994). Put plainly, if voters do not have sufficient information to 
make a decision, racial and ethnic cues will come in especially handy, but for those who are 
more politically engaged, racial and ethnic cues are merely one more piece of factual 
information. The reasoning leads to the second hypothesis: 
H2: Racial and ethnic cues operate with particular effectiveness among those who are 
previously less engaged in politics. 
 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA  
To estimate how racial and ethnic cues affect turnout, I employed a survey-based 
experiment. The purpose of the experiment design is to address two questions: First, does the 
appearance of Asian American candidates on the ballot matter to Asian voters? Second, can 
coethnic candidates, compared to non-Asian candidates, more effectively motivate voters to the 
polls?  
The main treatment is the ethnicity of the candidate, with effect being gauged by turnout 
intent. First, I offered four treatment statements included a candidate with Asian descent, 
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including two statements with a Chinese American candidate (Chen) and two with Asian Indian 
American candidate (Iyengar). The other statement, presented to the control group, included two 
candidates with common American names (William Jones and James Anderson).  
The Asian American candidates’ names are designed to maximize the possibility that 
respondents can quickly identify their ethnicities. The Chinese American candidate is “Andrew 
Chen,” and the Asian Indian American candidate is “Sahil Iyengar.” According to the Asian 
surname list compiled by Lauderdale and Kestenbaum (2000), Chen is the second most common 
Chinese surname conditional on available racial information. The last name “Iyengar” appeared 
547 times in the 2000 Census data.80 More than 93% of those whose surname was “Iyengar” 
self-identified as “Non-Hispanic Asian and Pacific Islander Only.”81  
Secondly, to push the experiment further, I also include an additional treatment in which 
the national origin of the candidate’s parents is stated in order to explore the impact of 
additional, credible ethnic priming. For each pair of treatment statements in which an Asian 
candidate was running, one stated the national origin of the Asian American candidate's parents, 
and the other did not. The statement of the control group did not mention the national origin of 
either candidate’s parents. 
The logic here is simple. I designed the candidate’s name as an ethnic cue, and used the 
national origin of the candidate’s parents to strengthen (or highlight) the connection between the 
candidate and a specific ethnic group. The second treatment is particularly useful because even if 
voters cannot recognize the ethnic background of the surnames, parental origin explicitly ties the 
candidate to that specific group. It also deepens the connection of the candidate to the particular 
nationality, which could lead to a greater sense of connection with voters sharing that nationality. 
In other words, the second treatment ensures the availability of the candidate’s ethnic cue to 
voters. To validate the experimental design, I also conducted a manipulation check to test 
whether the fictional candidate names provide the expected racial and ethnic cues to participants. 
                                                
80 There is no evidence showing that “Iyengar” is more popular among Muslims or Hiduism. 
81 Source: http://names.mongabay.com/data/i/IYENGAR.html. (Last Access Date: March 24, 2010) 
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In a pilot study with a manipulation check of 89 respondents recruited on the campus of 
the University of Texas at Austin, 74% were able to identify Andrew Chen's ethnicity as 
Chinese, 86% were able to identify James Anderson as White, while 54% were able to recognize 
Sahil Iyengar as Asian Indian. Results of the pilot study indicates that respondents thought 
Andrew Chen and Sahil Iyengar was more interested in serving the Asian American community 
than James Anderson (statistically significant at the 0.05 level).82 In summary, the designed 
treatment succeeded in manipulating the candidates’ perceived ethnic backgrounds by varying 
their names. 
Participants were recruited either through email lists of several on-campus Asian 
American associations (for instance, the Center of Asian American Studies, Asian American 
Round Table, and Vietnamese Students Association) 83 or flyers posted on campus. The entire 
questionnaire was computer-based and took approximately 15 minutes to complete. Each subject 
was given $10 upon the completion of the questionnaire for his or her time and efforts. In total, 
300 subjects were successfully recruited and completed the survey. 
When participants arrived at the Behavioral Lab in the Department of Government at UT-
Austin, respondents were randomly assigned to one of the five groups and presented a distinct 
statement about a hypothetical city council election featuring two candidates was presented. As 
indicated earlier, each statement was identical with the exception of two factors: the candidates’ 
names and their parental origin. Three reasons justify using a city council election in the 
statement. First, Hispanic and Asian American voters are more likely to vote for candidates who 
share their racial and ethnic backgrounds in local elections (Hajnal and Troustine 2005). Due to 
                                                
82 Another potential racial and ethnic hint presented in the statement is the name of the law firm associated with 
each candidate. Respondents were asked to evaluate the interest of the named law firm in serving the Asian 
American community using a 0-10 scale. On average, participants rated the “Wang Law Firm” as having a higher 
interest in serving the Asian American community than the “LLC Law Firm” (statistically significant at the 0.05 
level). This may contribute to the high level of turnout intent of the control group in the fictional city council 
election compared to the national level. However, comparisons of likely turnout between the control group and other 
groups show no evidence that the Wang law firm’s name has elevated turnout among treatment groups. 
83 Other associations contacted include Asian sororities and fraternities, and religious groups such as Asian 
American Campus Ministry. 
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residential concentration, racial and ethnic minorities have a better chance to elect one of their 
own to local offices than to federal ones. Second, in order to provide plausible scenarios without 
invoking suspicion, I use local elections, which usually receive less attention than federal 
elections. Third, while political parties no doubt play a role in national elections, candidates have 
more leeway in running local campaigns.84 The aforementioned conditions jointly allow me to 
offer a realistic yet compelling situation with which to gauge participants’ reactions. 
[Table 5-1 about here] 
The experimental components were embedded within the Asian American Political 
Attitudes and Behavior Survey conducted at the University of Texas at Austin from March 3 to 
March 26, 2009.85 Table 5-1 presents the complete experiment design, and Appendix C shows 
the exact wording of the statements.  
Immediately after the inserted statement, respondents were asked to rate the likelihood of 
voting (on a zero to ten scale) if the election were held tomorrow. The scale runs from 0, which 
is “definitely would not vote,” to 10, which is “definitely would vote.” The actual average was 
almost exactly in the middle (the average is 5.27 with a standard error 0.17). The choice of a 
zero-to-ten scale rather than a dichotomous measure is based on the advantage of measuring 
variation in intention of voting. 
 
THE IMPACT OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC CUES ON ASIAN TURNOUT INTENT 
The results offer variable support for each of the hypotheses tested. All told, each 
treatment effectively boosts turnout when compared to the control group, and this impact is 
especially prominent among the less politically engaged. There are, however, some caveats. 
When an Asian American candidate's name is on the ballot, the likelihood of voting is always 
higher than for the control group, although the differences are not large.  
                                                
84 While some may suggest that providing party affiliations of the fictional candidates can make the scenario even 
more realistic, I on purpose omit this piece of information to control for the effect of partisanship. 
85 The survey was briefly interrupted by the 2009 spring break March 16-21. 
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Turnout averages are as follows: Chen, 5.07 (with a standard error 0.39); Chen with 
parents from China, 5.46 (s.e.=0.35); Iyengar, 5.17 (s.e.=0.38); Iyengar with parents from India, 
6.03 (s.e.=0.34); Control Group, 4.63 (s.e.=0.39). Thus, only the Iyengar with parents from India 
treatment emerges as statistically significant at the 0.05 level. 
To gain leverage on the question of whether the treatment at large affects turnout, I break 
the groups into three categories by treatment. In so doing, the effects of candidate name and 
parental origin become more evident (Figure 5-1). The average likely turnout of those who see 
an Asian candidate running for the city council election is 5.12 (s.e. 0.27). It rises to 5.75 (s.e. 
0.24) for those who not only know an Asian candidate is running, but also the candidate's 
explicit connection to their own ethnic groups (F=3.37, p < 0.05, n=296). Each treatment results 
in a statistically and substantively significant turnout increase (at least 10 percentage points). 
More notably, those who were exposed to the Asian candidate and information about his parents’ 
nationality were 24 percentage points more likely to vote than those in the control group. 
[Figure 5-1 About Here] 
By design, the fictional candidates are either Chinese or Asian Indian. One may also ask 
whether voters extend their support for a coethnic candidate to someone outside of their own 
group. To answer this question, I focus on Chinese and Asian Indian participants, respectively.  
The pattern among Chinese American participants is mostly suggestive (the left panel of 
Figure 5-2). Chinese participants appeared to need clear ethnic cues to act. Only when Chinese 
participants (n=61) knew that Chen’s parents were from China did they become more likely to 
vote. Furthermore, there was no such reaction to the Indian candidate, Iyengar. 
Coethnic enthusiasm is stronger among Asian Indian participants (n=90). Their likely 
turnout is higher when Iyengar is running for the office (6.71, s.e. 0.63) even if they were not yet 
told that his parents were from India, compared to when both candidates are non-Asian (4.89, s.e. 
0.74). When Indian participants knew that Iyengar’s parents were from India, their turnout intent 
was dramatically higher (7.29, s.e. 0.45). The substantive effect is a 49-percentage point increase 
in the probability of turning out to vote (easily significant at the 0.05 statistical level).  
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Similarly, coethnic and cross-ethnic effects are noticeable among Asian Indians. Asian 
Indian turnout is 11-percentage points higher when Iyengar was on the ballot compared to Chen 
(coethnic effect; comparing the “Chen” bar to the “Iyengar” bar in Figure 5-2). On the other 
hand, Asian Indian turnout is 24-percentage points higher when Chen is running compared to the 
control group (cross-ethnic effect; comparing the “Chen” bar to the “Iyengar” bar). Interestingly, 
when Indian participants learned that Iyengar’s parents were from India, their likely turnout 
declined.86 In short, Indian participants react more to Iyengar than to Chen; but when Chen runs 
for the office, Asian Indians are still more likely to vote than when a non-Asian candidate is 
running. The aforementioned findings suggest some complex interaction between the candidates’ 
and voters’ ethnicity in explaining Asian turnout. To examine these possible interactions, I 
extend the analysis to consider both voters’ and candidates’ ethnicities. 
[Figure 5-2 About Here] 
Our matched pairs (i.e. Chinese participants who saw Chen on the ballot, and Indian 
participants who saw Iyengar on the ballot) have a much higher turnout level (6.39, s.e. 0.19, 
n=71) than the non-matched pairs (4.92, s.e. 0.32, n=225). Put another way, a coethnic candidate 
increases turnout likelihood by 30 percentage points (t=3.90, p <.001). Conversely, there is little 
turnout effect among non-coethnics. To say that Asian Americans will not be able to form a 
panethnic coalition is undoubtedly an overstatement, but there is little supportive evidence for 
this possibility either. The lukewarm reaction of Asians in Austin to non-coethnic candidates87 
contrasts with Collet’s (2005) finding on panethnic (or corss-ethnic) support among Vietnamese 
in Little Saigon. One plausible explanation focuses on the extent to which commonality within 
the community has been developed. In California, for example, the length of Asian residency, 
residential stability, and the growth of the Asian population in particular locales, the 
                                                
86 One plausible explanation is the international relations between Asian India and China. However, evidence drawn 
from the data is not sufficient to determine the hypothesis. 
87 Vietnamese turnout, in the Austin sample, was not affected by the treatment. 
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commonality of Asian groups within certain community are probably better established. Thus, 
panethnic (or cross-ethnic) support for non-coethnic candidates is more likely to take place.88 
[Figure 5-3 About Here] 
To test whether the effect of ethnic cues on turnout varies by attentiveness and interest, I 
first measured levels of engagement. In the survey, respondents were asked to check all types of 
political activities they took part in the past four years. Most respondents had only voted in 
primaries (27%) or general elections (58%). Still, one third (31%) joined in a political meeting or 
rally, and one fifth (20%) was involved in campaign fundraising (Figure 5-4). One's level of 
political engagement is measured by summing up participation in various political activities, 
ranging from 0 (participating in no political activity in the past four years) to 7 (participating in 
all types of political activities listed)89 (Figure 5-5). Among the 300 participants, roughly one 
third (29%) did not participate in any political activities over the last election cycle, while 
another quarter (26%) only took part in one, less than one fifth (17%) joined two, only about one 
in ten (14%) participated in three, and the remaining 15% of the sample participated in four or 
more.90 The “less politically engaged” are those whose participation level is below the average 
(1.70 with a standard deviation of 1.64), while those whose participation level is above the 
average are the “more politically engaged.” Put another way, the more politically engaged were 
those who participated in more than one type of political activities in the last presidential election 
cycle, and the less politically engaged were those who participated in only one kind of political 
activity or less previously. In general, the self-reported turnout probability of the more politically 
engaged (5.83, s.e. 0.24, n=136) was higher than that of the less politically engaged (4.81, s.e. 
0.22, n=164). This unsurprising difference was significant at the 0.01 level. 
                                                
88 On the other hand, if members of one single ethnic group make up the local Asian community, the established 
ethnic enclave may constrain the operation of panethnic effect. 
89 Political activities include fundraising and campaign donation, political meeting or rally, demonstration, 
contacting with officers or representatives, contacting editors of newspapers, voting in primaries, and voting in 
general elections. 




[Figure 5-4 About Here] 
[Figure 5-5 About Here] 
More importantly, controlling for engagement lends support to the claim that the effect of 
ethnic cues is especially prominent among the less politically engaged (Figure 5-6). The pattern 
observed among the less politically active is self-explanatory (the left panel of Figure 5-6): 
compared to seeing two Anglo candidates on the ballot, the turnout probability was higher 
among those Asian American respondents who saw either Chen or Iyengar running for the city 
council election (+0.32), and an explicit ethnic tie with Chen or Iyengar increased the turnout 
even higher (+1.39). The treatment effects, however, disappear among the more politically 
engaged (the right panel of Figure 5-6). In fact, ethnic cues allow the less engaged Asian 
Americans to overcome turnout differentials with more engaged Asian Americans. The left panel 
of Figure 5-6 shows that less engaged Asians rate their turnout likelihood at 5.52 after seeing an 
article about a coethnic candidate; this exceeds the 5.14 likelihood estimated among more 
engaged control group respondents.  
 [Figure 5-6 About Here] 
In sum, there are three main findings in this chapter. First, Asian Americans show a 
tendency to value descriptive representation. Secondly, not only do ethnic cues operate 
effectively among Asian American voters, but this effect is particularly strong among the less 
politically engaged. Lastly, the effectiveness of ethnic cues may (or may not) suggest some 
difficulties for panethnic or even cross-ethnic coalitions among Asian Americans. The data show 
differences in Chinese turnout for Chen versus Chinese turnout for Iyengar. Similar differences 
exist among Indians respondents. Clearly, there is a little less enthusiasm for a non-coethnic 
(albeit panethnic) candidate. As Kaufmann (2003) suggests, the essence of a strong coalition is a 
well-developed common ground among the allies (e.g., the occasional “non-White” commonality 
among African Americans and Latinos) even though sometimes the perception of 
“commonality” can be non-reciprocal (McClain et al. 2003). A common ground on which 
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While the existing literature largely confirms the descriptive representation theory among 
African Americans, Hispanics, and females, the effect of ethnic cues among Asians at the 
individual level is understudied. The data presented here suggest Asian Americans also value 
descriptive representation. The empirical analysis focuses on a survey-based experiment 
involving a fictional city council election. Two treatments are inserted into a news story, one 
varying the main candidate’s ethnicity and the other varying information about the main 
candidate’s parents’ nationality. Both the candidate’s Asian-sounding surname and the national 
origin of his parents significantly increase turnout among Asian voters. At the same time, effects 
vary by the voters’ ethnicities, with a stronger turnout effect associated with coethnic candidates. 
The effectiveness of ethnic cues among Asian Americans suggest that the lack of these 
cues may have contributed to their low level of turnout. In addition, ethnic cues are especially 
effective among the less politically engaged. Information shortcuts are particularly useful for 
those who do not frequently follow up with politics. As a result, the less politically engaged 
make decisions based on eye-catching cues. This poses a challenge for Asian American political 
elites. In order to win elections, Asian American candidates not only need to appeal to Asian 
voters, but also to non-Asian voters as well. Inevitably, the need to mobilize coethnics may 
conflict with the need to broaden the appeal of Asian American candidates. 
These findings and their political implications should not be taken unconditionally. The 
first caveat is one shared by all laboratory experimental studies. The survey was conducted in 
Austin and in a university facility, which inevitably attracted a sample of relatively young, 
liberal-leaning, well educated, more affluent, and more U.S.-born Asian Americans. The lack of 
variation in age and education limited the capacity of the study to investigate the impacts of 
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socioeconomic status and demographics on political participation within the Asian American 
community. On the other hand, the Austin sample has obvious merits. Initially, drawing the 
Austin sample from a college population controls for the effects of age and socioeconomic 
status. In addition, the sample (better educated and higher income) mirrors the relatively high 
achievement levels of Asian Americans at the group level. 
Furthermore, using an experimental design and a hypothetical political scenario enables 
the study to control for spurious relationships. The experimental data, nonetheless, limit the 
researchers' ability to go beyond the hypothetical situation. In reality, political candidates and 
campaign strategists engage in a number of activities in response to a variety of constantly 
changing circumstances. In addition, Asians that voluntarily affiliate themselves with an Asian 
association may be more sensitive to ethnic cues than the general Asian American population. 
Have said all this, the experimental data at hand clearly offer some insight into symbolic 
representation among Asian Americans that ought to inform future studies. 
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CHAPTER SIX: Summary And Conclusions 
 
In March 2011 the U.S. Census Bureau released the 2010 overview of race and 
Hispanic origin. The brief highlighted opposing trends in the population distribution: 
although non-Hispanic Whites were still the largest racial/ethnic group, they have the 
slowest growth rate, while the Hispanic and Asian populations are growing considerably, 
partially due to relatively high levels of immigration (Humes, Jones, and Ramirez 2011). 
Yet, political commentators and scholars have long-noted the lukewarm political 
participation rates among Hispanics and Asian Americans (Ramos 2004; Kim 2007; 
Barreto 2010; Lai 2011; Lee and Hajnal 2011). Unfortunately, we do not know much 
about why these groups “under-achieve” politically, nor can we offer much of a plan for 
improvement, if desired. We thus know that the electoral landscape has changed over the 
last decade, but our understanding of how these fast growing electorates can be politically 
engaged has some catching-up to do. 
 
LESSONS LEARNED: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
The relatively high levels of socioeconomic status among Asian Americans at the 
group level and their low levels of participation puzzle political scientists. The 
introduction of this dissertation notes this conundrum. Essentially, the project seeks to 
develop and test theoretically motivated research hypotheses with an eye towards the 
practical politics of mobilization. The process by which immigrant populations 
incorporate into the political system has been one of the central themes in our discipline. 
Practically, systemic legitimacy and perhaps party advantage depend on mobilizing the 
peripheral electorates.  
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I began this dissertation by asking some basic questions. What explains Asian 
American political participation, since the prediction of the socioeconomic model is off 
the mark? How do these experiences affect their political incorporation? To what extent 
do individuals feel connected to the larger community? Does a sense of group 
connectedness elevate Asian turnout? Does their group identities that acknolwledge both 
their American-ness and Asian-ness/ethnicity effectively motivate individuals to 
participate in politics? How do Asian American acculturation experiences influence their 
views of themselves? Can the appearance of Asian American candidates on the ballot 
sufficient to energize Asian American voters? Does the effect of ethnic cues prevail 
among all Asian Americans? 
As outlined in Chapter two, my consideration of Asian American political 
participation has pursued two directions. I first explore the causes of Asian American 
turnout, with a focus on acculturation experiences, group connectedness, and group 
identity. Furthermore, I examine factors of group identity formation. I then further 
investigate how ethnic cues affect Asian American turnout. My main argument is that the 
more acculturated Asian Americans are, the more likely they are to participate in 
American politics. In addition, those who embrace both their American-ness and Asian-
ness/ethnicity in their identities are more likely to take part in the political process. Tag 
along the same line, the presence of racial and ethnic cues (or a lack thereof) on the 
political stage may help us understand Asian turnout in the United States. 
The Asian American population is largely comprised mainly of immigrants, for 
whom the adaptation and adjustment to the U.S. is an ongoing process. This implies two 
things. First, the general political socialization experiences we expect in non-Hispanic 
White households are not necessarily taking place in Asian American homes. Second, 
their acculturation experiences—which involve interacting and negotiating with the 
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present society—help to update their behavioral repertoire by defining their roles and 
social positions. New identities are developed that ultimately influence political behavior. 
The significance of acculturation experiences and group identity in understanding Asian 
American political participation suggests that ethnic cues are important for the Asian 
American community. The question is, to what extent?  
The second argument pursued in this dissertation is that Asian American voters’ 
turnout rates will be higher when Asian American candidates run for an office. 
Presumably, the underlying mechanism is that ethnic cues provide a hint of possible 
policy responsiveness or promise resulting in an elevated turnout rate. This is especially 
true among those who are less politically engaged. In short, the presence of Asian 
American candidate can conditionally energize Asian American voters. 
Chapter 3 examines the demographic and political contour of the Asian American 
population. The comparisons of educational attainment, income, and turnout rates with 
other groups demonstrate the central puzzle of the project: how can a such well-off group 
be so apolitical? The size of the foreign-born population within the Asian American 
community, and the focus of Asian American on economic and education (i.e., non-
political) achievements help us understand the disconnection between prediction and the 
reality. In particular, the gap of education and income effects on turnout between Whites 
and Asians becomes more noticeable among the better educated and the wealthier. After 
taking nativity (i.e., U.S.-born status) into consideration, the difference of socioeconomic 
status effects appears to exist between the U.S.- and foreign-born populations, but not 
within the U.S.- or foreign-born populations. 
The empirical analysis of Chapter 4 examines the effect of acculturation 
experiences, group connectedness, and group identity on Asian American turnout using 
the Pilot National Asian American Political Survey data (conducted by Lien, Conway, 
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and Wong) supplemented with in-depth interviews. Despite the heterogeneity of 
historical paths and cultural practices, different Asian ethnic groups are largely viewed as 
one bloc. The analysis of logit regression models shows that length of residency (or 
residential stability), shared culture perceptions, “Asian/ethnic American” identity, age, 
political interest, partisan strength, and religious attendance increase the turnout rate. On 
the other hand, the Asian-born status decreases the probability of voting. In other words, 
the findings lend support to the acculturation and group identity hypotheses that these 
factors have influence on turnout among Asian Americans. 
Furthermore, a closer look at group identity formation reveals effects of 
acculturation experiences and group connectedness on group identity. The former 
facilitates one’s embracement of American-ness as well as Asian-ness/ethnicity, while 
the latter tends to further highlight individual’s unique race/ethnicity. English proficiency 
in general increases the likelihood of acknowledging one’s American-ness in her identity. 
Residential stability helps to foster a hybrid identity such as “Asian/ethnic American.” A 
sense of shared culture only has a positive impact on the formation of “Asian American” 
identity. On the other hand, racial/ethnic discrimination experiences tend to discourage 
Asian Americans from embracing their American-ness.  
The significance of being Asian-born begs for further examination. Comparisons 
of demographics between the U.S.-born and Asian-born populations highlight certain 
systemic differences. The U.S.-born Asians tend to be more residentially stable, more 
aware of their racial/ethnic discrimination experiences, slightly more likely to perceive 
cultural commonality among Asians, view themselves as “(ethnic) American,” have 
higher levels of socioeconomic status, and attend religious services less. In addition, in-
depth interviews with Asian American voters, activists, and elites conducted for the 
project in the Austin area, TX, reveal that although one’s “Asian American” or “ethnic 
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American” identity may denote cultural practices, it does not necessarily connote political 
needs and interests. A pan-Asian coalition is not impossible, but it looks to be a 
considerable challenge. 
While Chapter 4 focuses on the roles of acculturation and group identity in 
understanding Asian American turnout, Chapter 5 directly tests the impact of ethnic cues 
on turnout for Asian American subgroups. To control for spurious relationships, an 
experiment was conducted on the University of Texas at Austin campus with a fictional 
city council election in which two candidates were presented to respondents: one had an 
Asian surname (and, in some treatments, parents from Asia) while the other did not. The 
analysis of the experiment demonstrates the effectiveness of ethnic cues on Asian 
American turnout, especially when the ethnic ties of the Asian American candidate are 
augmented by the candidate’s parental origin. In other words, the presence of an Asian 
American candidate on the ballot can successfully mobilize Asian American voters. This 
effect is conditioned by the voters’ previous political engagement. For those who were 
less politically engaged, the effect of ethnic cues on turnout is more prominent; 
moreover, the clearer the ethnic tie of the Asian American candidate to a specific group 
is, the more effective the cues are. With ethnic cues, less politically engaged Asian 
American voters might even participate at the polls at the same level as the more 
politically engaged. Among the more politically engaged, however, ethnic cues do not 
produce such effect on turnout. Furthermore, the results also present a challenge in that 
mobilization effects are limited for cross-ethnic groups, while there is no doubt that 
Chinese Americans are eager to vote for a Chinese American candidate, there is no 
evidence that (for example) Vietnamese or Korean Americans share the enthusiasm. 
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FORGING AHEAD: AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
It is worth noting that the findings presented here are relevant to the future of the 
American party system. In the run-up to the 2012 election, the media and political 
commentators have speculated about the possibility that the Republican nominee could 
select an Asian American vice-presidential candidate. Both South Carolina Governor 
Nikki Hayley and Louisiana Governor Bobby Jindal have drawn substantial attention, 
and each could be a major player beyond 2012.91 The appeal of these candidates is, in 
part, due to their presumed appeal to the burgeoning Asian American electorate. The 
potential for Asian American voters on the national stage has already been previewed in 
local elections. For instance, “Asian alone” or in combination made up 58% and 55% of 
the entire populations of Daly City (in San Mateo County) and the City of Fremont (in 
Alameda County), respectively (Jones 2011).92 
This project is not, of course, a handbook for Asian American mobilization. 
Instead, it seeks to provide a window into the political incorporation of the Asian 
American community. To contextualize the findings of the present project into the 
broader literature, I realize there are more gaps to fill. While the descriptive outline of the 
Asian American population in chapter 3 and empirical analysis of national data in chapter 
4, the residential clustering of Asian American households begs for further investigation 
at the more local levels. As some scholars note, local ethnic-based organization and 
                                                
91 Bobby Jindal not only was suspected to be Senator McCain’s running mate in the 2008 presidential 
election, upon his quick endorsement on Texas Governor Perry’s short-lived presidential candidacy, 
reporters immediately inquired the possibility of him running for the 2012 presidential election as well as 
vice-presidential position. For instance, see “Meet the Press” moderated by David Gregory (available at 
http://www.mediaite.com/tv/bobby-jindal-rules-out-2012-presidential-run-but-vp-is-possibility/) (last date 
of access: March 12, 2012), and report about Jindal’s victory on the 2011 gubernatorial reelection 
(available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/23/us-usa-election-louisiana-
idUSTRE79M07V20111023) (Last date of access: March 12, 2012). 
92 The report is available at http://www.apiidv.org/files/2010Census-WHIAAPI-2011.pdf. (Last date of 
access: March 12, 2012) 
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media are important conditions for the electoral success of ethnic candidates (Barreto 
2010; Lai 2011). One additional question, then, is “what are the catalysts that propel or 
motivate these organizations and media to arise?” Perhaps more controversially, does the 
relative similarity of socioeconomic resources between Asian Americans and Whites 
predict a possible political coalition between the two groups? Or will Asian Americans 
politically become allies of African Americans and/or Hispanics?93 
Chapter 4 suggests that acculturation experiences indeed have an impact on 
political participation and group identity formation. But we still do not know what being 
an “Asian American” or “ethnic American” or “American” means to individuals in social 
and/or political terms. One of the interview participants stated that while he embraced 
cultural practices such as using chopsticks skillfully, he insisted that when it came to 
politics, he was “American” rather than “Asian American.”94 Does the identity “Asian 
American” have the same meaning for someone who resides in California (with its higher 
concentration of Asian Americans) as for another individual who lives in Texas (with a 
growing Asian American population) or Alabama (where Asians are 1% of the state 
population95)? Or should scholars disentangle the effect of acculturation on political 
participation on specific ethnic group (e.g., Vietnamese, Chinese), instead of treating 
Asians in America as a panethnic group, given each group’s historical trajectory? To an 
extreme, is “Asian American” even politically meaningful to Asian Americans at all? 
                                                
93 In an unpublished manuscript, my coauthor and I find that African Americans are less likely to form a 
coalition with Asian Americans, but Asian Americans do not view African Americans as an unlikely 
partner, using the 2005 Intergroup Relations survey conducted for the National Conference for Community 
Justice. 
94 Similarly, while some celebrated the success of Jeremy Lin, others worried that the stereotype of Asians 
continued to linger in sports (see NPR report at http://www.npr.org/2012/02/16/146994147/op-ed-linsanity-
is-thrilling-yet-frustrating) (last date of access: March 12, 2012) and current sitcoms (for example, see NPR 
report at http://www.npr.org/2012/02/24/147221312/for-asians-and-latinos-stereotypes-persist-in-sitcoms) 
(last date of access: March 12, 2012). 
95 The figures are calculated among those who reported one race only. 
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Unlike African Americans (with shared memory of slavery) and Hispanics (with shared 
language), Asian Americans, may not be similar enough to develop a coherent panethnic 
identity? 
In addition, while chapter 4 emphasizes acculturation experiences, what happens 
to second-generation Asian American households? The parents and their children are 
both U.S.-born. Does that imply the increasing significance of socialization experiences 
in these homes? Given the changes in immigration and naturalization laws in the twenty-
first century, the composition of the Asian and Hispanic populations likely will change, 
with an increasing proportion of U.S.-born descendants and a decreasing number of 
immigrants. With the size of second- and later-generation immigrants grows, will the 
positive impact of shared culture on “Asian American” identity and turnout (indicated in 
this dissertation) fade away? 
Lastly, the effect of ethnic cues illustrated in chapter 5 deserves extension beyond 
the laboratory. In the experiment, two major candidates were designed to be almost 
identical and a single statement was the only information provided to participants. 
However, campaigns in real time usually involve more than a one-time message or 
activity, and contrasts between competing candidates can be easily drawn from the news. 
Asian American voters expressing a bit of enthusiasm for an Asian American candidate is 
one thing; non-Asian American voters’ reaction to this Asian American candidate may be 
quite another. Given the size of Asian American electorates, the electoral success of 
Asian American candidate must rely on multiracial coalitions, which necessitates 
developing common ground, such as minority status, immigration and language policies 
(Kaufmann 2003a; Lai 2011). 
A decade after the conclusion of Lai, Cho, Kim, and Takeda (2001) that “the 
literature had little to say about the relationship between politically organized Asian 
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Americans and external strategic political elites,” this project offers a few small steps 
forward for understanding the complex issues of Asian American politics. The puzzles 
and other questions raised by the present project, however, deserve further investigation. 
Researchers continue to investigate the means by which immigrant populations 
incorporate into American political system. The growth of the Asian American electorate, 
as well as the emergence of political elites with Asian descents, has captured more public 
attention and scholarly interest since the turn of the twenty-first century. There is no 
doubt that Asian American population is still smaller than that of Whites, African 
Americans, and Hispanics. Yet, the relevance and potential of Asian Americans in 
American politics is unquestionable. 
97 
Appendices 
APPENDIX A RESULTS OF BASELINE MODEL BY RACE AND ETHNICITY 
 Asian 
Americans 
Whites Blacks Hispanics 
Education .18 (.02)*** .32 (.01)*** .24 (.02)*** .19 (.01)*** 
Income .05 (.01)*** .10 (.003)*** .08 (.01)*** .08 (.01)*** 
Gender (Male) -.15 (.09) -.23 (.02)*** -.60 (.07)*** -.19 (.06)** 
Age < 30 -.28 (.12)* -.64 (.03)*** -.47 (.08)*** -.52 (.07)*** 
Age >65 .47 (.14)** .95 (.03)*** .54 (.11)*** .83 (.11)*** 
Nativity (U.S.-
born) 
.37 (.10)*** .65 (.07)*** .47 (.16)** -.31 (.08)*** 
Constant -7.85 (.73)*** -13.20 (.23)*** -8.78 (.65)*** -7.45 (.45)*** 
     
N 2206 53875 5937 5088 
P < .001 < .001 < .001 < .001 
-2log-likelihood 2756.93 50759.16 5298.02 6233.92 
Pseudo R2 .07 .14 .10 .09 
Source: The 2008 Current Population Survey. 
Note: Numbers in the cells are coefficients of binary logit regression with standard errors 
in parentheses. 
***: p < .001, **: p < .01, *: p < .05 
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APPENDIX B DEMOGRAPHICS OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS 
ID Age Gender Education Occupation 
C1 41 F MA Homemaker 
C2 30 F BA Homemaker 
C3 29 M MA Program Specialist 
C4 34 M MA Grad Student 
C5 24 M BA Software engineer 
C6 31 M BA Grad Student 
C7 26 M BA Grad Student 
C8 32 M JD Attorney 
C9 31 M BA Software engineer 
C10 55 F Ph.D Administrator  
C11 28 M JD Lawyer 
C12 31 F MS Librarian 
C13 20 M High School graduated College student 
C14 38 M MA Lecturer and writer 
J1 25 F MA Graduate Student 




APPENDIX C SCRIPTS OF THE EXPERIMENTAL STATEMENTS 
Group  In an election for city council, there are two candidates for the position, ...[insert treatment] ...  
In addition to the similar backgrounds, [Candidate A] and [Candidate B] in fact also share their 
views on education, immigration reform, social services, as well as issues related to economic 
growth. Both claim to represent the best interests of the district. 
 
Chen, China Andrew Chen and James Anderson. Andrew Chen was born in Houston, Texas. Both of 
Andrew's parents came to the United States in 1965 from Mainland China. Two years later, 
Andrew was born on July 8, 1967. After earning his J.D. in 1995, Andrew has been working for 
The Wang Law Firm in Austin. The other candidate, James Anderson, who was born on May 3, 
1966  in Bryan, Texas. Both of James' parents were born in the United States. James earned his 
J.D. in 1992 and currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin. 
 
Chen Andrew Chen and James Anderson. Andrew Chen was born on July 8, 1967, in Houston, Texas. 
After earning his J.D. in 1995, Andrew has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. 
The other candidate, James Anderson, was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas. James earned 
his J.D. in 1992 and currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin. 
 
Iyengar, India Sahil Iyengar and James Anderson. Sahil was born in Houston, Texas. Both of Sahil's parents 
came to the United States from Asian India in 1965. Two years later, Sahil was born on July 8, 
1967. After earning his J.D. in 1995, Sahil has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. 
The other candidate, James Anderson, was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas, and earned 
his J.D. in 1992. Both of James' parents were born in the United States. James currently works 
for LLC Law Firm in Austin. 
 
Iyengar Sahil Iyengar and James Anderson. Sahil Iyengar was born on July 8, 1967,  in Houston, Texas. 
After earning his J.D. in 1995, Sahil has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. The 
other candidate, James Anderson, was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas, and earned his 
J.D. in 1992. James Anderson currently works for LLC Law Firm in Austin. 
 
Control  William Jones and James Anderson. William was born on July 8, 1967, in Houston, Texas. 
After earning his J.D. in 1995, William has been working for The Wang Law Firm in Austin. 
James Anderson was born on May 3, 1966 in Bryan, Texas, and earned his J.D. in 1992. James 






Tables and Figures 
Table 3-1 The Composition of Adult Citizens in the United States 
 White Black Hispanic Asian Others 
2000 78 12 7 3 0 
2002 76 12 8 3 1 
2004 75 12 8 3 2 
2006 74 12 9 3 2 
2008 73 12 9 3 3 
Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008. Numbers in cells are 
percentages of raw numbers divided by numbers of adult citizens in the United States.  
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Table 3-2 Demographics by Race and Hispanic Origin in 2008 









By Gender      
.Male 48 44 49 47 48 
.Female 52 56 51 53 52 
      
By Education      
.Less than 9th grade 2 3 11 6 3 
.9th to 12th grade, no diploma 6 13 14 4 8 
.High school graduate 31 37 33 19 32 
.Some college/associate’s 
degree 
30 30 29 24 30 
.Bachelor’s degree 20 12 10 31 18 
.Advanced degree 10 5 4 16 9 
      
By Family Income      
.Less than $10,000 2 8 5 1 3 
.$10,000 to $14,999 2 6 5 2 3 
.$15,000 to $19,999 2 5 4 1 3 
.$20,000 to $29,999 7 11 13 6 8 
.$30,000 to $39,999 8 12 13 6 9 
.$40,000 to $49,999 7 8 9 7 7 
.$50,000 to $74,999 19 15 17 15 18 
.$75,000 to $99,999 13 8 9 11 12 
.$100,000 to $149,999 13 5 8 16 11 
.$150,000 and over 9 3 4 13 8 
Median Family Incomea  54698 33255 34397 59324 50046 
      
By Citizenship Attainment      
.U.S. Born 97 94 74 38 93 
.Naturalized 3 6 26 62 7 
Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008. Numbers in cells are 
percentages of raw numbers divided by numbers of adult citizens, except for median 
family income. 
a The 1999 Census Data. 
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All 66 65 50 48 64 
      
By Gender      
.Male 64 61 48 48 62 
.Female 68 68 52 48 66 
      
By Education      
.Less than 9th grade 37 46 39 28 38 
.9th-12th grade, no diploma 38 50 35 25 40 
.High school graduate 56 61 40 32 55 
.Some college/associate’s 
degree 
69 71 61 47 68 
.Bachelor’s degree 79 76 70 57 77 
.Advanced degree 85 75 79 62 83 
      
By Family Income      
.Income not reported 53 45 36 26 49 
.Less than $10,000 47 60 35 40 49 
.$10,000 to $14,999 48 68 44 28 51 
.$15,000 to $19,999 55 71 41 37 56 
.$20,000 to $29,999 58 65 43 46 56 
.$30,000 to $39,999 64 73 47 34 62 
.$40,000 to $49,999 68 65 55 41 65 
.$50,000 to $74,999 73 77 57 49 71 
.$75,000 to $99,999 78 78 68 71 76 
.$100,000 to $149,999 81 77 70 58 78 
.$150,000 and over 84 78 80 61 82 
      
By Citizenship Attainment      
.U.S. Born 66 65 48 45 64 
.Naturalized 57 59 54 49 54 
Source: The Current Population Survey (CPS) from 2000 to 2008. Numbers in the cell 
are the number of people who reported voted divided by the numbers of citizens. 
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Table 4-1 Estimating Asian Turnout 
  Turnout (Full Sample)   
  B s.e. 
Acculturation   
  Length of Residency .06*** .01 
  English (home) .09 .16 
Group Connectedness   
  Shared Fate with Asians -.13 .20 
  Shared Culture .35** .11 
  Discrimination .34 .21 
Group Identity   
  “American” .64 .38 
  “Asian American” .84** .30 
  “Ethnic American” .57* .24 
Demographics   
  Asian-Born -1.09*** .30 
  Chinese .52 .27 
  Japanese -.42 .41 
  Filipinos -.24 .28 
  Age .03*** .01 
  Education (College +) .40 .23 
  Income (Above $60K) .26 .21 
  Female .24 .20 
  Political Interest .33** .11 
  Partisanship (Strong) .50* .23 
  Religous attendance .27*** .07 
Constant -4.92*** .71 
   
-2 Likelihood 661.26  
Pseudo R-Square .22  
Pr > chi2 < .001  
N 613   
Source: Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001. 
Note: Numbers in the cells are coefficients of binary logit regressions with standard 
errors in parentheses. 




Table 4-2 Estimating Asian American Group Identity 
 “American”  “Asia  
American” 
 “Ethnic  
American” 
 
 B s.e. B s.e. B s.e. 
Acculturation       
  Length of Residency .03 .02 .03* .01 .04** .01 
  English (home) 1.82*** .27 .96*** .19 .51** .16 
Group Connectedness       
  Shared Fate with other Asians -.46 .37 .18 .30 -.08 .24 
  Shared Fate with the ethnic group .11 .37 .17 .30 .34 .24 
  Shared Culture .24 .17 .36** .14 .09 .11 
  Discrimination -.80* .34 -.60* .26 -.51* .20 
Demographics       
  Asian-Born -1.71*** .45 -.83* .39 -.52 .34 
  Chinese -.60 .57 -.50 .31 .03 .23 
  Japanese -.39 .53 -1.34* .54 -.41 .43 
  Filipinos -.32 .45 -.28 .37 .42 .30 
  Age .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
  Education (College) .41 .38 -.18 .27 .18 .22 
  Income (Above $60K) .03 .34 -.01 .28 .29 .22 
  Female -.87** .31 -.64** .24 -.41* .19 
Constant -4.33*** 1.01 -2.39** .76 -1.33* .63 
       
-2 Likelihood 1568.34      
Pseudo R-Square .15      
Pr > chi2 < .001      
N 713      
Source: Pilot National Asian American Political Survey (PNAAPS), 2000-2001. 
Note: The reference group (base category) is those who identify as “Asian” or “ethnic” 
only. Numbers in the cells are coefficients of binary logit regressions with standard errors 
in parentheses. 
***: p < .001, **: p < .01, *: p < .05. 
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Table 5-1 The Experimental Design 
Candidates A: Mentioning the origin 
of candidate's parents 
B: No mentioning of the 
origin of candidate's parents 
1. One Chinese surname, one 
common American surname 
Chen, China Chen 
2. One Asian Indian surname, 
one common American surname 
Iyengar, India Iyengar 








Figure 3-1 Ratios of Adult Citizens to Voting Age Population 













White Black Hispanic Asian U.S.
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Figure 3-2 Registration Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin 






















Figure 3-3 Voting Rates by Race and Hispanic Origin 
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Figure 3-4 Voting Rates among the Registered by Race and Hispanic Origin 




















Figure 3-5 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education, Race and Ethnicity 
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Figure 3-8 Predicted Probability of Voting by Education (U.S.-born) 
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Figure 4-1 Conceptual Framework 
Acculturation!
















Figure 4-2 Distribution of Group Identity by Ethnicity 
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One-Way ANOVA: F = 3.37, p < .05, n=296. 
 
 117 
















































































Indian Participants Only 
 
 









































Results of Comparing Means: t = 3.90, p < .001, n=296 
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